Category: Administrative Law Page 20 of 38

By: Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: Federal Court of Appeal Reviews CEAA “Justification” Determination for Lower Churchill Falls

Case Commented On: Council of the Innu of Ekuanitshit v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 189

At least three times in the course of the past year, an environmental assessment (EA) panel convened under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012, SC 2012, c 19 (CEAA, 2012) has concluded that a project is likely to result in significant adverse environmental effects: Shell’s Jackpine Mine Expansion, Taseko’s New Prosperity Mine, and Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Pipeline. In the case of both Jackpine and Northern Gateway, the federal Cabinet determined that these effects were “justified in the circumstances,” but not so for New Prosperity. In none of these instances, however, did the relevant “Decision Statement” pursuant to section 54 of CEAA, 2012 contain any explanation or reasons for Cabinet’s decision. The Federal Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Council of the Innu suggests that this approach is wrong. This litigation involved the Lower Churchill Hydroelectric Project proposed by Nalcor in Newfoundland. This project was reviewed under the previous CEAA regime but the relevant provisions are virtually unchanged. Like the three EAs referred to above, the panel concluded that the project was likely to result in significant adverse environmental effects. Unlike the three projects referred to above, however, the government did provide a detailed explanation for its determination that the significant adverse environmental effects were justified in the circumstances. The Council challenged this determination (the Council also challenged the sufficiency of Aboriginal consultation; this post focuses only on the justification issue).

Syncrude v Canada: Where is the gatekeeper when you need one?

By Shaun Fluker

On September 12, 2014

In Administrative Law, Climate Change, Environmental

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Syncrude v Canada: Where is the gatekeeper when you need one?

Case Commented On: Syncrude Canada Ltd v Attorney General of Canada, 2014 FC 776

This post continues on from the introductory comment posted by Nigel Bankes on September 11, 2014 (here) concerning this case, and discusses the administrative law aspects in Justice Zinn’s decision. Briefly put, Syncrude challenges the validity of the Renewable Fuels Regulations, SOR/2010-109 enacted pursuant to section 140 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33 [CEPA]. Section 139 of CEPA together with the Renewable Fuels Regulations require diesel fuel produced, imported or sold in Canada to contain renewable fuel of at least 2% by volume. Syncrude produces diesel fuel, and is thus subject to this requirement unless it can successfully argue the Renewable Fuels Regulations are ultra vires the authority of the Governor in Council or that there is some other legal defect in how the rules have been administered against it. My comment focuses on two points in the decision, namely: (1) are the Renewable Fuels Regulations unlawful because they do not conform to the regulation making powers of the Governor in Council set out in section 140 of CEPA?; and (2) did the Minister err in law by failing to afford Syncrude procedural fairness in administering the regulations?

What is the Test for Leave to Appeal from the Decision of a Regulatory Tribunal in Alberta?

By Nigel Bankes

On February 7, 2014

In Administrative Law, Appellate Practice

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: What is the Test for Leave to Appeal from the Decision of a Regulatory Tribunal in Alberta?

Case commented on: Judd v Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board, 2014 ABCA 41

The provincial legislature has chosen to “channel” judicial supervision of the decisions of Alberta’s energy regulators to the Alberta Court of Appeal. The legislature achieves this channeling through two linked provisions in the relevant legislation. The first is a strong privative clause which purports (I say purports because such a measure can never be completely successful for constitutional reasons: Crevier v Attorney General of Quebec, [1981] 2 SCR 220, Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9) to exclude ordinary judicial review applications. Then, having purported to close the door, the legislature cracks it open again with a provision that allows an aggrieved party to appeal the regulator’s decision on a point of law or jurisdiction, but only with leave. The leave application is heard by a single judge who is charged with assessing whether the matter should be heard by three of his or her colleagues on the merits of those alleged points of law or jurisdiction. The relevant provisions of the Energy Resources Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c E-10 in force at the time read as follows:

Shell Jackpine Mine Expansion Project: The Mysterious Case of the Missing Justification

By Martin Olszynski

On December 12, 2013

In Administrative Law, Energy, Environmental

PDF Version: Shell Jackpine Mine Expansion Project: The Mysterious Case of the Missing Justification

Document commented on: Decision Statement Issued under Section 54 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 re: Shell Jackpine Mine Expansion Project (2013 ABAER 011/Decision 2013-011)

Last Friday (December 6, 2013), the federal Minister of the Environment, Leona Aglukkaq, released the long-awaited decision statement for Shell’s Jackpine Mine Expansion project. As I wrote here, the joint review panel concluded – for the first time in the oil sands context – that the project was likely to result in numerous significant adverse environmental effects. This conclusion triggered the application of subsection 52(2) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19 (CEAA, 2012), pursuant to which the Governor in Council (GiC) must determine whether the project is nevertheless “justified in the circumstances.” This the GiC did. Or at least, we are told that it did.

Constitutional Questions and the Alberta Energy Regulator

By Nigel Bankes

On October 24, 2013

In Aboriginal, Administrative Law, Constitutional

PDF Version: Constitutional Questions and the Alberta Energy Regulator

Decisions commented on: (1) ERCB Letter Decision, April 18, 2013, re Fort McKay First Nation, Notice of Question of Constitutional Law; (2) ERCB Letter decision, May 23, 2013, reasons for decision in relation to Fort McKay First Nation, Notice of Question of Constitutional Law; (3) 2013 ABAER 014, Dover Operating Corporation, Application for a Bitumen Recovery Scheme Athabasca Oil Sands Area, August 6, 2013; and (4) Fort McKay First Nation v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2013 ABCA 355

The Alberta Court of Appeal has granted leave to the Fort McKay First Nation (FMFN) to appeal two questions of law or jurisdiction in relation to decisions made by the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) (the predecessor to the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER)) and the AER itself in approving, subject to the further approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, Dover’s application for a major steam assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) bitumen recovery project. The two questions on which leave was granted are as follows:

(a) Whether the Tribunal erred in law or jurisdiction by finding that the question whether approval of the project would constitute a meaningful diminution of the Treaty rights of the Fort McKay First Nation and therefore be beyond provincial competence was not a question of constitutional law as defined in the Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act;

(b) Whether the Tribunal erred in law or jurisdiction by finding that it had no jurisdiction to consider constitutional issues other than those defined as “questions of constitutional law” in the Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act.