Category: Constitutional Page 10 of 71

The New Definition of a ‘Mental Disorder’ in the Mental Health Amendment Act: A Potential Gap in Care for ‘Persistent’ Mental Disorders?

On August 13, 2020

PDF Version: The New Definition of a ‘Mental Disorder’ in the Mental Health Amendment Act: A Potential Gap in Care for ‘Persistent’ Mental Disorders?

Bill Commented On: Bill 17, the Mental Health Amendment Act, 2020, 2nd Sess, 20th Leg, Alberta, 2020

Bill 17, the Mental Health Amendment Act (MHAA) was introduced to the legislature on June 4, 2020, with an anticipated proclamation date set for September, 2020. While presented by Tyler Shandro, the Minister of Health, as aimed at “strengthening the rights of these patients and assuring their rights are provided for and respected while they receive care” (Alberta Hansard, June 4, 2020 at 1125), this Bill also represents the province’s response to JH v Alberta Health Services, 2019 ABQB 540 (CanLII), which found several provisions of Alberta’s Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13 (MHA) an infringement on a person’s rights under sections 7, 8, 10(a) and (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms.

In particular, the legislature recognized the Court’s concern in JH as to the suitability of the MHA’s provisions for involuntary detention and treatment for persons suffering from mental disorders that are untreatable, and has sought, in the MHAA, to refocus, and perhaps narrow, these provisions upon persons who are suffering from severe mental illness that are capable of being resolved by treatment. This change finds expression in the MHAA’s change to the definition of a “mental disorder”, which now excludes “a disorder in which the resulting impairment is persistent and caused solely by an acquired or congenital irreversible injury.” In this post, I want to consider the potential effects of this change in caring for persons now excluded under the MHAA’s definition. My concern is that this new definition may create a gap in the current legislative scheme for the care of persons suffering from “persistent” mental health disorders, and place such persons – and others – at risk. This would certainly be an ironic – and I am sure unintended – outcome of legislation which has as its aim the strengthening of the rights of persons suffering from mental disorders.

Offers to Settle and The Public Interest in Charter Litigation: Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460

By Drew Yewchuk

On August 12, 2020

In Constitutional, Costs

By: Drew Yewchuk & Sarah Shibley

PDF Version: Offers To Settle and the Public Interest in Charter Litigation: Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460

Case Commented On: Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460 (CanLII)

Stewart v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2020 ONCA 460 (CanLII) is a costs decision that concludes a ten-year legal battle about the power of police to stop and search protestors. Mr. Stewart was successful in obtaining a court decision that the Toronto Police Service (TPS) had violated the Charter by searching him without lawful justification and interfering with his freedom of speech. Despite his success, because of the Toronto Police Service’s $10,000 settlement offer to Mr. Stewart in 2017 and Ontario’s rules for litigation costs and offers to settle, it ultimately cost Mr. Stewart more than $60,000 to successfully enforce his constitutional rights. This post argues that the normal cost rules relating to offers to settle are ill suited to public interest litigation against government bodies.

Restoring Balance? Bill 32, the Charter, and Fair Democratic Process

By Colin Feasby

On July 15, 2020

In Constitutional

By: Colin Feasby

PDF Version: Restoring Balance? Bill 32, the Charter, and Fair Democratic Process

Bill Commented On: Bill 32, Restoring Balance in Alberta’s Workplaces Act, 2020, 2nd Sess, 30th Leg, Alberta, 2020

On July 7, the United Conservative Party (UCP) government introduced Bill 32, styled the Restoring Balance in Alberta’s Workplaces Act, 2020. Bill 32 makes a number of changes to Alberta’s labour relations statutes that are of questionable constitutionality. The focus of this post is only on the constitutional dimensions of Bill 32’s impact on the capacity of unions to participate in political activities. Bill 32 is interesting from the perspective of democracy jurisprudence because it appears to be a paradigmatic example of the use of legislative power to silence or impair the efficacy of political opponents. A constitutional challenge to Bill 32, which seems inevitable based on early statements by Alberta unions, promises to provide a forum for the consideration of whether political animus is relevant to constitutional analysis. This post does not express a view on the constitutionality of Bill 32; rather, it explores how courts should approach constitutional analysis of legislation that has an obvious negative effect on political opponents of the government.

Adding Zora to the 1L Crime Syllabus

By Lisa Silver

On July 2, 2020

In Constitutional, Criminal, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Adding Zora to the 1L Crime Syllabus

Case Commented On: R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 (CanLII)

It is never too soon to start thinking about the fall semester – in fact, I keep a running list of changes to make to my syllabus throughout the year. But this year, it seems that the newest Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 (CanLII), is going to be added to my syllabus in more places than one. Zora is a rare decision in which the Court does much with so little. I do not say this flippantly but seriously. On the surface, the issue of whether the offence of failure to comply with a release order under section 145(3) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, requires objective or subjective mens rea seems trite. In fact, any 1L student might be asked to do such an analysis on a law school exam. Yet, Zora soars as Justice Sheilah Martin expertly analyzes the issue holistically, humanely and firmly anchored in the Charter. In doing so, Justice Martin, on behalf of the entire Court, is weaving together a narrative based on the histories of all those accused who have carried their bail conditions like dead weight, from the moment of arrest and right up to the courtroom doors. In this post, I will share 5 reasons why I am adding Zora to my 1L Crime syllabus.

Supreme Court of Canada Finally Addresses Racial Profiling by Police

By Meryl Friedland

On June 26, 2020

In Constitutional, Criminal, Police, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Meryl Friedland

PDF Version: Supreme Court of Canada Finally Addresses Racial Profiling by Police

Cases Commented On: R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 (CanLII); R v Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11 (CanLII)

Nine minutes. This is the length of time that a police officer pressed a knee to the neck of George Floyd in the United States, while he lay on the ground immobilized, pleading, stating he couldn’t breathe. Nine minutes is a shockingly long time for Constable Chauvin to have exerted deadly force on a human being whom he had already rendered vulnerable. He could only do this without interference because of the power provided to him by the state. He could only do this because violent race-based state conduct is nothing new – far from it.

Our current Canadian protests expose the local experience of abusive and racist police tactics, both systemic and overt, against Black, Indigenous, and other racialized Canadians. These protests and the action urged by them have the potential to mobilize and enact change. The criminal justice system is reactionary, but it can still send a message denouncing unlawful conduct with the aim of preventing it from recurring. Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has given us new tools in this fight, by addressing racial profiling twice in the past year in R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 (CanLII) and R v Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11 (CanLII). It has taken an exceptionally long time for our highest court to give us these tools. Although these judgments are a start, unquestionably there is still much work to be done, both in and out of the courts.