Category: Constitutional Page 30 of 71

Rights, Camera, Action

On June 20, 2016

By: Erin Sheley

Case Commented on: R v McCoy, 2016 ABQB 240 (CanLII)

The series of police encounters that triggered the Black Lives Matter movement have raised many bitter and potentially unanswerable social questions about the relationship between law enforcement and the citizen. From the perspective of criminal procedure, however, they have also demonstrated the importance of video evidence in establishing the “true” story behind the inherently fraught, often violent, almost-always subjective situation of an arrest. In a context where a few words or gestures can make the difference between a colourable case of resisting arrest and an unwarranted exercise of police force, we have seen how eyewitness accounts can be flatly contradictory. As Justice Iaccobucci pointed out in R v Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, referring to video-recorded confessions, police notes may accurately record the content of what is said, but cannot capture tone or body language in a way that recording can (at para 46, citing J.J. Furedy and J. Liss, “Countering Confessions Induced by the Polygraph: Of Confessionals and Psychological Rubber Hoses” (1986), 29 Crim LQ 91, at 104). In light of this potentially important evidentiary function, the in-car digital video system (ICDVS, or “dash cam”) has become an increasingly widely-used piece of police technology. RCMP officers are required to make use of dash cams in all cars equipped with them (see K Division Operational Manual at s 1.1).

The Power of a Trustee in Bankruptcy to Disclaim Unproductive Oil and Gas Properties and the Implications for the AER’s Liability Management Program

By Nigel Bankes

On June 17, 2016

In Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Constitutional, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Power of a Trustee in Bankruptcy to Disclaim Unproductive Oil and Gas Properties and the Implications for the AER’s Liability Management Program

Case commented on: Redwater Energy Corporation (Re), 2016 ABQB 278 (CanLII)

In a much anticipated decision Chief Justice Neil Wittmann has concluded that there is an operational conflict between the abandonment and reclamation provisions of the province’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-6 (OGCA) and Pipeline Act, RSA 2000, c P-15 and the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA). Thus, a trustee in bankruptcy is free to pick and choose from amongst the assets in the estate of the bankrupt by disclaiming unproductive oil and gas assets even where (and especially so) those assets are subject to abandonment orders from Alberta’s oil and gas energy regulator, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER). As a result, the value of the bankrupt’s productive assets is preserved for the benefit of secured creditors. AER abandonment orders do not bind a trustee with respect to the disclaimed properties and do not constitute costs of administration of the bankrupt’s estate. Since the trustee has no responsibility for disclaimed assets, the trustee should be in a position to transfer non-disclaimed producing assets to a third party purchaser without objection from the AER on the basis of any deterioration in the liability rating associated with the unsold non-producing assets. If either the AER or the Orphan Well Association (OWA) carries out the abandonment of the disclaimed assets such costs may constitute a provable claim in bankruptcy but, as a general creditor, the AER/OWA would likely only recover cents on the dollar.

The practical effect of this decision is that the AER’s authority to enforce abandonment orders at the cost of the licensee is unenforceable at precisely the time when the AER most needs to be able to exercise that power i.e. when the licensee is insolvent.

Five Million Dollars Versus One Night in Jail

By Drew Yewchuk

On June 1, 2016

In Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Five Million Dollars Versus One Night in Jail

Case Commented On: R v Peers, 2015 ABQB 129 (CanLII), R v Peers, 2015 ABCA 407 (CanLII), leave to appeal granted May 26, 2016

On May 26, 2016 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) granted leave to appeal from the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Peers. The three appellants are all charged with a variety of offences under section194 of the Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, which provides for a maximum penalty of “a fine of not more than $5 000 000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than 5 years less a day, or to both”. The basis of their appeal is that section11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — which guarantees “the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment” — entitles them to a jury trial, because a penalty of five years less a day of imprisonment and a $5 000 000 fine is “a more severe punishment” than “imprisonment for five years”. This appeal raises a constitutional question left open 27 years ago in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 (CanLII) (Irwin Toy): can some personal economic rights be protected by the section7 Charter guarantee of “life, liberty, and security of the person?”

A Terminal Dispute? The Alberta Court of Appeal Versus the Federal Government on Assisted Death

By Jennifer Koshan

On May 26, 2016

In Constitutional, Health Law

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: A Terminal Dispute? The Alberta Court of Appeal Versus the Federal Government on Assisted Death

Case and Legislation Commented On: Canada (Attorney General) v E.F., 2016 ABCA 155 (CanLII); Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying), 42nd Parliament, 1st Session (as amended by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights)

Anyone not familiar with the controversy surrounding assisted death got a taste of it last week during the debate over Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying), which culminated in Elbowgate in the House of Commons. Also last week, in the first appellate decision to consider assisted dying post-Carter, the Alberta Court of Appeal weighed in on the criteria for constitutional exemptions during the suspension of the declaration of invalidity of the criminal provisions which prohibit assisted death (see Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 (CanLII) (Carter 2015) and Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4 (CanLII) (Carter 2016); and for posts on those decisions see here and here). The Court of Appeal’s decision in Canada (Attorney General) v E.F., 2016 ABCA 155 (CanLII), highlights the lack of congruence between what Carter 2015 constitutionally required and what the government has, so far, delivered in Bill C-14, particularly when it comes to whether a person seeking medical assistance in dying must have an illness that is “terminal”. E.F. also comments on the appropriate role of the Attorney General of Canada in applications seeking judicial authorization of the constitutional exemption allowing assisted dying in certain circumstances during the suspended declaration of invalidity.

BCCA Unfortunately Chooses Not to Follow Alberta’s Lead on the Issue of Whether the Charter Applies to Universities

By Linda McKay-Panos

On May 25, 2016

In Constitutional

By: Linda McKay-Panos

PDF Version: BCCA Unfortunately Chooses Not to Follow Alberta’s Lead on the Issue of Whether the Charter Applies To Universities

Case Commented On: BC Civil Liberties Association v University of Victoria, 2016 BCCA 162 (CanLII)

There are a number of ABlawg posts dealing with the issue of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) applies to universities (see: Face-ing the Charter’s Application on University Campuses; University Campus is not Charter-Free; Freedom of Expression, Universities and Anti-Choice Protests). Many of these decisions involve freedom of expression, which is considered to be a very important element of university life (e.g., for academic freedom, free discussion and debate of ideas). Recently, I posted about a case involving the University of Victoria (see Does the Charter Apply to Universities? Pridgen Distinguished in U Vic Case) in which the British Columbia Supreme Court did not follow the judgment of Alberta Court of Appeal Justice Paperny in Pridgen v University of Calgary, 2012 ABCA 139. Although the case law synthesized by Justice Paperny was not determinative in Pridgen, her judgment provides an excellent, logical synthesis of how the precedents on the application of the Charter should be applied in various contexts, including universities. This post discusses the BCCA decision on the University of Victoria case.