Category: Constitutional Page 59 of 74

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s Marriage Commissioners Decision – What are the Implications for Alberta?

On January 18, 2011

Case and Legislation Commented On: In the Matter of Marriage Commissioners Appointed under the Marriage Act, SS 1995, c M-4.1, 2011 SKCA 3; Marriage Act, RSA 2000, c M-5

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal ruled last week on the constitutionality of proposed amendments to Saskatchewan’s Marriage Act, S.S. 1995, c.M-41, which would have allowed marriage commissioners to decline to perform marriage ceremonies that were contrary to their religious beliefs. The Court found that the proposed amendments violated the equality rights of gays and lesbians under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that this violation could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter because the Saskatchewan government had not minimally impaired the rights of same sex couples in the way it had set out the proposed scheme for religious exemptions.

What are the implications of the decision in Alberta? Surprisingly, the Marriage Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-5, still defines marriage as “marriage between a man and a woman” (section 1(c); see also the preamble), even though in 2004 the Supreme Court confirmed that the power to determine whether same sex couples have the capacity to marry belongs to the federal government under section 91(26) of the Constitution Act 1867 (Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698). While the Alberta government tried to shield the law by using section 33 of the Charter, the notwithstanding clause, that clause could not have saved the invalidity of the Act on division of powers grounds, and the relevant section of the Marriage Act expired in 2005 in any event. Furthermore, Alberta marriage commissioners have been performing same sex marriages in this province since 2005 in spite of the heteronormative definition in the Marriage Act. An attempt to bring in a law similar to that ruled upon in the Saskatchewan case was defeated when Bill 208, the Protection of Fundamental Freedoms (Marriage) Statutes Amendment Act, 2006, was blocked by members of Alberta’s opposition parties. This Bill would have amended the Marriage Act and human rights legislation to protect marriage commissioners who refused to perform same sex marriages on religious or moral grounds. On the face of it then, marriage commissioners in Alberta do not have the sort of opting out protection that was considered in the Saskatchewan case.

Melissa Luhtanen of the Alberta Civil Liberties Research Centre will be providing further analysis of the Saskatchewan case and its implications in Alberta on ABlawg; readers may also be interested in this post on the case by Denise Réaume on the Women’s Court of Canada blog.

Is R v Gomboc really only about a homeowner’s expectation of privacy or is there more to it?

By Brian Seaman

On January 12, 2011

In Constitutional, Criminal, Supreme Court of Canada

PDF version: Is R v Gomboc really only about a homeowner’s expectation of privacy or is there more to it?

Case commented on: R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55

The late November 2010 decision of Canada’s Supreme Court in R. v. Gomboc has come to represent one of two things in the divergent views of its critics and supporters. For critics from a civil libertarian perspective, our highest court’s approval of a power company’s act, pursuant to a warrantless police request, of monitoring a homeowner’s electrical usage and then providing that information to police engaged in a criminal investigation represents yet another example of a culture of authoritarianism that seems to be creeping into Canada’s judiciary. On the other hand, for the “law and order” crowd, especially those who see warrants as pesky obstacles to simply letting the police get on with it and just do their jobs, homeowners have no reasonable expectation of privacy over information about their electrical usage, so the Supreme Court’s decision that an authorizing warrant was not required is spot on. Furthermore, even if there was a breach of any privacy interest a person may have here, then it was so trivial that any fuss over it is unwarranted.

Sliding Down the Slippery Slope

By Maureen Duffy

On December 29, 2010

In Constitutional, Criminal

PDF version: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope

Case considered: R. v. Loewen, 2010 ABCA 255

In the area of national security, the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, have been characterized by an increased dominance of state power in terms of investigation, interrogation, and detention powers, often at the expense of individual liberties. This dominance has become entrenched in some respects in Canada, as well as in a number of other democratic nations, and in many ways has become so familiar that it arguably represents a new normal, rather than an extraordinary situation.

It is my belief that, while this shift has attracted most attention in the national security arena, and is primarily advanced in that arena, the increasing acceptance that individual rights must give way to state security interests sets the stage for the proverbial slippery slope, lending credibility to arguments for the erosions of individual rights in more traditional criminal matters as well. As an example, the increasing tendency of national governments to allow for warrantless searches in cases in which terrorism is alleged may arguably have served as an undercurrent for the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55 (overturning a ruling by the Alberta Court of Appeal and upholding a warrantless request by Calgary police to an electrical company to install a recording device, designed to measure electrical usage, to determine whether the person under investigation was growing marijuana).

Using water reservations to protect the aesthetic values associated with water courses: a note on the Spray River (Banff)

By Nigel Bankes

On December 20, 2010

In Constitutional, Water Law

PDF version: Using water reservations to protect the aesthetic values associated with water courses: a note on the Spray River (Banff)

Documents commented on: Order in Council 546\49; South Saskatchewan Basin Water Allocation Regulation, Alta. Reg. 307/1991 (rescinded by Bow, Oldman and South Saskatchewan River Basin Water Allocation Order, Alta. Reg. 171/2007); Alberta Environment, TransAlta Utilities (TAU) licence for the Spray River development.

I have been doing some work on Crown water reservations over the last few months and in the course of that came across an example of what at first glance seemed to be the use of a water reservation to preserve the aesthetic qualities of a watercourse. The example also has an interesting constitutional twist that is worth reflecting on.

Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Charter: LEAF’s Intervention in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On December 16, 2010

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Charter: LEAF’s Intervention in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham

Cases Commented On: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), et al. v Barbara Cunningham, et al. (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Case number 33340, on appeal from Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 239

The Supreme Court of Canada is scheduled to hear the appeal of the Alberta government in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham on Thursday, December 16, 2010. Cunningham will be the first case in which the Supreme Court considers the application of section 15(2) of the Charter since that Court gave independent meaning to section 15(2) in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 and the first case in which the Court must consider the possible application of section 15(2) when the challenge is on the basis of under-inclusiveness. This comment is based on my experience serving on the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) case subcommittee in Cunningham, the factum filed by LEAF, and, to a much lesser extent and only to offer a contrast, the facta of the Appellants and the Attorney General of Ontario.