Category: Criminal Page 33 of 39

Decision considered: R v Kasim, 2011 ABCA 236.

The Respondent claimed to have drunk no more than 3 or 4 beers between 7 and 8:30 p.m. on September 18, 2008. He was behind the wheel soon after. At about 9 p.m. he complied with a lawful demand for an Intoxilyzer breath sample and the two samples he provided measured 100 mg percent, or 20 mg percent over the legal maximum of 80 mg of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. At trial the Respondent testified that his body temperature was elevated as he was suffering from the flu or a fever that day. This testimony was corroborated, and the trial judge accepted it. The Respondent’s expert witness, Dr. Malicky, testified that given the Respondent’s elimination rate, and an elevated body temperature, “his blood alcohol level at the time should have been approximately 36 mg percent if he had three containers of beer, and 60 mg percent if he had four containers of beer” (R v Kasim, [2010] AJ No 969, para 64). The Respondent argued that the test results were therefore askew and that raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he the violated the Criminal Code (RSC, 1985, c C-46). Both the Provincial Court judge and Queen’s Bench summary conviction appeal judge found for the Respondent. By consent order the Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal on a single issue: “The summary conviction appeal judge erred in law in her interpretation of s. 258(1) (c) of the Criminal Code” (CA decision at para 7). These Criminal Code provisions set out presumptions that subject to certain time and other limitations Intoxilyzer readings of blood alcohol are accurate. The provisions also limit permissible challenges to the presumed accuracy.

The Repeal of the Long Gun Registry: A Violation of the Federal Government’s Obligations Concerning Violence Against Women?

By Jennifer Koshan

On December 8, 2011

In Constitutional, Criminal, Family, Human Rights

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: The Repeal of the Long Gun Registry: A Violation of the Federal Government’s Obligations Concerning Violence Against Women?

Legislation considered: Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act (“Ending the Long-gun Registry Act”), 41st Parliament, 1st Session

December 6, 2011 was the National Day of Remembrance for Violence Against Women, which marked the 22nd anniversary of the Montreal Massacre. The Globe and Mail‘s Jane Taber indicated that “government MPs [were] purposely shut out from officially speaking at and attending an event on Parliament Hill to honour the 14 young women who were shot dead in 1989,” because the government is about to repeal the long gun registry (see Bill C-19). The Montreal Massacre was one of the pressure points for the registry, as was the use of firearms in crimes of domestic violence. When the Alberta government challenged the constitutionality of the registry, which was implemented via the Firearms Act, SC 1995, ch 39, as an amendment to the Criminal Code, the Supreme Court found that it was properly enacted under the federal government’s criminal law powers (see Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), 2000 SCC 31, [2000] 1 SCR 783 at paras 43, 59). The enactment of the law creating the registry was constitutional; but is its repeal unlawful? I think an argument can be made that the federal government’s abolishment of the long gun registry is unconstitutional on Charter grounds, as well as contrary to international law.

Pleading Fairly

By Alice Woolley

On July 18, 2011

In Criminal, Ethics and the Legal Profession

PDF version: Pleading Fairly

Case considered: R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34

Introduction

In its June 3, 2011 Throne Speech, the Canadian government announced its plan to introduce an omnibus crime bill. Based on the limited information provided in the Speech, it appears that this legislation will increase the sanctions for some crimes, and eliminate judicial discretion on some matters of criminal sentencing:

Our Government will move quickly to reintroduce comprehensive law-and-order legislation to combat crime and terrorism. These measures will protect children from sex offenders. They will eliminate house arrest and pardons for serious crimes. They will give law enforcement officials, courts and victims the legal tools they need to fight criminals and terrorists. Our Government will continue to protect the most vulnerable in society and work to prevent crime. It will propose tougher sentences for those who abuse seniors and will help at?risk youth avoid gangs and criminal activity. It will address the problem of violence against women and girls (Throne Speech, p. 12).

The Throne Speech emphasized that the purpose of this legislation would be to protect “the personal safety of our citizens” and to “place the interests of law-abiding citizens ahead of criminals” (Throne Speech, p. 12).

Consciousness and Consent in Sexual Assault Cases

By Jennifer Koshan

On June 17, 2011

In Criminal, State Responses to Violence, Supreme Court of Canada

PDF version: Consciousness and Consent in Sexual Assault Cases

Case considered: R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28

Can a person consent in advance to sexual activity that occurs while she is unconscious? A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada recently answered this question in the negative in R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28, taking the same approach as a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Ashlee, 2006 ABCA 244. There were strong dissents in each case, however, indicating that the resolution of this issue is far from obvious for some judges. Also interesting is that judges on both sides of the issue frame their analyses in terms of the sexual autonomy of the complainant, and see their decisions as consistent (or at least not inconsistent) with the leading Supreme Court of Canada authority on consent, R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330. This comment will discuss the J.A. and Ashlee decisions and assess the merits of the different reasons for decision in light of the applicable statutory provisions and case law and the courts’ attention (or lack thereof) to context.

Is R v Gomboc really only about a homeowner’s expectation of privacy or is there more to it?

By Brian Seaman

On January 12, 2011

In Constitutional, Criminal, Supreme Court of Canada

PDF version: Is R v Gomboc really only about a homeowner’s expectation of privacy or is there more to it?

Case commented on: R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55

The late November 2010 decision of Canada’s Supreme Court in R. v. Gomboc has come to represent one of two things in the divergent views of its critics and supporters. For critics from a civil libertarian perspective, our highest court’s approval of a power company’s act, pursuant to a warrantless police request, of monitoring a homeowner’s electrical usage and then providing that information to police engaged in a criminal investigation represents yet another example of a culture of authoritarianism that seems to be creeping into Canada’s judiciary. On the other hand, for the “law and order” crowd, especially those who see warrants as pesky obstacles to simply letting the police get on with it and just do their jobs, homeowners have no reasonable expectation of privacy over information about their electrical usage, so the Supreme Court’s decision that an authorizing warrant was not required is spot on. Furthermore, even if there was a breach of any privacy interest a person may have here, then it was so trivial that any fuss over it is unwarranted.

Category: Criminal Page 33 of 39

Blow over? Think twice before blaming it on the flu.

The Repeal of the Long Gun Registry: A Violation of the Federal Government’s Obligations Concerning Violence Against Women?

Pleading Fairly

Consciousness and Consent in Sexual Assault Cases

Is R v Gomboc really only about a homeowner’s expectation of privacy or is there more to it?