Category: Environmental Page 23 of 53

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Let’s Shine Some Light into Creative Environmental Sentencing

Case Commented On: R v Canadian National Railway Company sentencing order dated June 2, 2017 (ABPC)

On June 12 the Alberta government announced that Canadian National Railway Company (CN Rail) had pled guilty to two offences under the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12 (EPEA) with respect to the release of hydrocarbons that occurred in April 2015. The penalty imposed on CN Rail was a total of $125,000, consisting of $15,000 in fines and a $110,000 payment in funds directed to the Edmonton and Area Land Trust to support conservation in the Edmonton region with a focus on aquatic and riparian habitat. This payment of funds to the Land Trust is known as a creative environmental sentence, and this post asks some critical questions about how this increasingly popular form of punishment for environmental offences is being implemented in Alberta.

Can Federal Legislative Jurisdiction Support a Broad, Sustainability-Based Impact Assessment?

By Martin Olszynski

On May 30, 2017

In Constitutional, Environmental

By: Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: Can Federal Legislative Jurisdiction Support a Broad, Sustainability-Based Impact Assessment?

Report Commented On: Expert Panel on the Review of Federal Environmental Assessment Processes, Building Common Ground: A New Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada

This is the fourth in a series of ABlawg posts to consider the report of the Expert Panel on the Review of Federal Environmental Assessment Processes. Professor Arlene Kwasniak wrote the first post, wherein she summarized the main contours of the Expert Panel’s recommendations; Professor Shaun Fluker and Drew Yewchuk (JD 2017) tackled the ever-present challenges of discretion, transparency and accountability; and Professor Sharon Mascher recently discussed the Expert Panel’s recommendations with respect to triggering. In this post, I tackle an area of lingering doubt in the Panel’s report, namely the federal government’s jurisdiction to make project-related decisions following a broad, sustainability-based impact assessment. In my view and as further set out below, this doubt is misplaced. My analysis is admittedly somewhat novel but doesn’t break entirely new ground – a similar analysis was put forward in the commentary following the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) 1992 CanLII 110 (SCC). Fundamental to my approach is the distinction between legislating with respect to a subject on the one hand, and subsequent decision-making pursuant to such legislation on the other.

Triggering Federal Impact Assessment: Lessons from Down-Under

By Sharon Mascher

On May 29, 2017

In Environmental, Protection of Spaces, Protection of Species

By: Sharon Mascher

PDF Version: Triggering Federal Impact Assessment: Lessons from Down-Under

Report Commented On: Expert Panel on the Review of Federal Environmental Assessment Processes, Building Common Ground: A New Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada

On April 5, 2017, the Expert Panel on the Review of Federal Environmental Assessment Processes released a report entitled Building Common Ground: A New Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada proposing major reforms to Canada’s federal environmental assessment processes. Professor Arlene Kwasniak has provided some background and an overview of key aspects of the report. Professor Shaun Fluker and Drew Yewchuk have commented on the Panel’s response to concerns raised by the University of Calgary’s Public Interest Law Clinic on behalf of the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS) Southern Alberta Chapter in relation to discretion, transparency and accountability.

The focus of this post is to comment on the Panel’s recommendations relating to the first of three fundamental questions it considered – what should require federal impact assessment (IA)? In answering this question, the Expert Panel reached the overall conclusion that “[t]here should be an appropriate threshold for effects on federal interests so that a trivial impact does not trigger IA. This threshold, defined as a consequential impact, should be tied to the sustainability framework.” To achieve this outcome, the Expert Panel recommends three different triggering mechanisms for projects, plans and policies clearly linked to matters of federal interest. The Expert Panel notes that Australia takes a similar approach, with environmental assessments required when a proposed action is “likely to have a significant impact on a matter of national environmental significance.” This post explores the similarities and differences between the Panel’s recommendations and the approach taken in Australia to ask what lessons can be learned from the Australian experience.

Majority of the Court of Appeal Confirms Chief Justice Wittmann’s Redwater Decision

By Nigel Bankes

On May 3, 2017

In Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Constitutional, Environmental, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Majority of the Court of Appeal Confirms Chief Justice Wittmann’s Redwater Decision

Case Commented On: Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Limited, 2017 ABCA 124 (CanLII)

The background to this case is discussed in my post on Chief Justice Wittmann’s decision here. That post summarized that decision and its effect as follows:

Chief Justice Neil Wittmann has concluded that there is an operational conflict between the abandonment and reclamation provisions of the province’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-6 (OGCA) and Pipeline Act, RSA 2000, c P-15 and the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA). Thus, a trustee in bankruptcy is free to pick and choose from amongst the assets in the estate of the bankrupt by disclaiming unproductive oil and gas assets even where (and especially so) those assets are subject to abandonment orders from Alberta’s oil and gas energy regulator, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER). As a result, the value of the bankrupt’s productive assets is preserved for the benefit of secured creditors. AER abandonment orders do not bind a trustee with respect to the disclaimed properties and do not constitute costs of administration of the bankrupt’s estate. Since the trustee has no responsibility for disclaimed assets, the trustee should be in a position to transfer non-disclaimed producing assets to a third party purchaser without objection from the AER on the basis of any deterioration in the liability rating associated with the unsold non-producing assets. If either the AER or the Orphan Well Association (OWA) carries out the abandonment of the disclaimed assets such costs may constitute a provable claim in bankruptcy but, as a general creditor, the AER/OWA would likely only recover cents on the dollar.

The practical effect of this decision is that the AER’s authority to enforce abandonment orders at the cost of the licensee is unenforceable at precisely the time when the AER most needs to be able to exercise that power i.e. when the licensee is insolvent. Furthermore, one of the AER’s principal mechanisms to ensure that a licensee has assets on hand to cover its liabilities (its authority to withhold consent to the transfer of assets which result in the deterioration of a licensee’s ability to discharge its obligations) is no longer available. Thus, the entire provincial scheme for protecting Albertans from the abandonment costs in relation to non-productive wells is seriously compromised, and, as a result, in the case of a bankrupt licensee the costs of abandonment will necessarily be assumed by the Orphan Well Fund or the province. If the costs are assumed by the Fund this means that the industry as a whole bears the burden; if the costs are assumed by the province (perhaps by a cash infusion into the Fund) this means that all Alberta taxpayers bear the burden of discharging these abandonment and reclamation obligations. While this result flies in the face of any conception of the polluter pays principle it is, according to Chief Justice Wittmann, the necessary result of the interpretation of the relevant statutes and the application of the constitutional doctrine of paramountcy.

Two appeals were launched, one by the OWA and one by the AER. Four intervenors lined up in support of the appellants: Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). Supporting the respondents was the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals. In reserved reasons the majority (per Justice Slatter with Justice Schutz concurring) dismissed the appeals. Justice Sheilah Martin dissented.

Do Comparisons Between Tobacco and Climate Change Liability Withstand Scrutiny?

By Martin Olszynski

On April 26, 2017

In Climate Change, Environmental

By: Martin Olszynski, Sharon Mascher, and Meinhard Doelle

PDF Version: Do Comparisons Between Tobacco and Climate Change Liability Withstand Scrutiny?

Research Commented On: “From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change Liability” (2017) Geo Envtl L Rev (forthcoming)

A few years ago, the Canadian Press reported that environmental groups were “taking inspiration from the legal fight against tobacco to fire warning shots at major energy companies over their alleged role in funding climate change denial and blocking climate-friendly legislation.” The next day, an editorial in the Calgary Herald suggested that “the comparison doesn’t stand up to even cursory examination. One is a product that is always hazardous to human health when consumed, the other is a staple of the modern world.” Setting aside for a moment the fact that tobacco wasn’t always understood as hazardous to human health (back in the 1950s, almost one in every two Americans smoked, and cigarettes were ubiquitous in homes, places of work, universities, restaurants and bars), the past few years have seen an increasing number of comparisons made between the fossil-fuel industry’s potential liability for climate change and “Big Tobacco’s” liability for tobacco-related disease. Very few of these comparisons, however, have considered the legally relevant similarities and differences between these two contexts in detail. In our most recent paper, recently accepted for publication in the Georgetown Environmental Law Review, we set out to do just that.