Category: Equality Page 2 of 4

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

Case Commented On: AG obo ZG v FirstService Residential Alberta Ltd, 2022 AHRC 38 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Residential Tenancies, Mental Disabilities, and Evictions

This case concerns a challenge to an eviction from a rented condominium – a challenge claiming the eviction discriminated against a tenant’s child on the ground of mental disability. There is something wrong with this decision to confirm the Director’s dismissal of the tenant’s complaint. The conclusion that there was no reasonable basis in the evidence to proceed to a hearing does not follow from the facts that are recounted. This may simply be because all the relevant facts are not set out in the decision. But based on the facts that are summarized, the most plausible –perhaps the only possible – inference is that the tenancy was terminated because the tenant’s son had a mental disability that the landlord, building manager, and other residents of the condominium building thought meant the son would endanger them or their property in the future, and no accommodation was possible.

Protection Against Online Hate Speech: Time for Federal Action

By Emily Laidlaw

On March 19, 2021

In Equality, Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion, Human Rights, Internet Law

By: Emily Laidlaw & Jennifer Koshan, with Emma Arnold-Fyfe, Lubaina Baloch, Jack Hoskins, and Charlotte Woo

PDF Version: Protection Against Online Hate Speech: Time for Federal Action

Legislation Commented On: Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6

Editor’s Note

During Equity, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) Week at the University of Calgary in February 2021, the Faculty of Law’s EDI Committee held a research-a-thon where students undertook research on the law’s treatment of equity, diversity and inclusion issues. Over the next few weeks, we will be publishing a series of ABlawg posts that are the product of this initiative. This post is the first in the series, which also closely coincides with the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination next week on March 21. The theme this year is “Youth Standing Up Against Racism”, which fits well with this initiative.

Introduction

On January 5^th, 2021, Erin O’Toole, leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, tweeted “Not one criminal should be vaccinated ahead of any vulnerable Canadian or front line health worker.” His tweet unsurprisingly went viral. To date the tweet has received 6.1k likes, 3.6k retweets and 4.8k comments. The tweet is representative of the kind of internet content we have grown increasingly and painfully accustomed to: content that is rhetorical, overblown, and often hateful, even if not explicitly directed at marginalized groups, and that occurs on a platform with global reach. When Erin O’Toole tweets, it is to an audience of 122.7k followers.

This post is not about Erin O’Toole’s tweet per se. Indeed, while his tweet dehumanizes prisoners and those with a criminal record, persons who are disproportionately Indigenous, it is not obvious, on its face, that it meets the legal standard of hate speech. Rather, this post is about what tweets like his represent in the struggle to regulate hate speech online: that so much we intuitively know is wrong falls into a legal grey area, and that much of the harm is the mob pile-on that the original post inspires. In the case of the O’Toole tweet, many tweets in response have been removed by Twitter, but it is noteworthy that thousands of others addressed the harmful nature of his statements with tweets such as “prison health is public health”, recognizing the risk of COVID-19 transmission in prisons.

Tugging at the Strands: Adverse Effects Discrimination and the Supreme Court Decision in Fraser

By Jennifer Koshan

On November 9, 2020

In Constitutional, Equality, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Tugging at the Strands: Adverse Effects Discrimination and the Supreme Court Decision in Fraser

Case Commented On: Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 (CanLII)

On October 16, 2020, the Supreme Court of Canada released its long-awaited decision in Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 (CanLII). Fraser involved a claim of adverse effects discrimination by female RCMP members who lost their entitlement to full pension benefits when they entered temporary job-sharing arrangements. We blogged on the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Fraser here, and – in the interests of disclosure – also participated in the Supreme Court intervention in Fraser by the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) (for LEAF’s news release following the Fraser decision, see here).

Fraser is the first successful adverse effects claim under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in over 20 years and it is the first ever successful adverse effects claim under section 15 in a sex discrimination context. This post will focus on the typical challenges that have been faced in adverse effects claims and review how Justice Rosalie Abella’s majority decision in Fraser responded to these problem areas, which were also apparent in the lower court decisions in Fraser. Although Justice Abella wrote for the majority of the Court (Chief Justice Richard Wagner and Justices Michael Moldaver, Andromache Karakatsanis, Sheilah Martin and Nicholas Kasirer, as well as herself), we will refer to the judgment as hers because it appears to be the culmination of her life-long work on equality rights and may be her last judgment on this subject before her retirement in 2021.

We also review the two dissenting judgments in Fraser, written by Justices Russell Brown / Malcolm Rowe and Justice Suzanne Côté. Our title is inspired by Justice Abella’s allegation that the dissent “tug[s] at the strands of a prior decision they disagree with … [to] unravel the precedent” (at para 133, referring to Alliance, one of the Court’s two 2018 pay equity decisions that we cite below). Interestingly, the same could be said of the majority judgement, which unravels the knots of a large body of section 15 jurisprudence that has made it difficult to prove adverse effects discrimination claims. It is these problem areas that we turn to next.

R v Theriault: A Case of Epistemic Injustice

By Brynne Harding

On October 20, 2020

In Access to Justice, Criminal, Equality, Youth and the Law

By: Brynne Harding

PDF Version: R v Theriault: A Case of Epistemic Injustice

Case Commented On: R v Theriault, 2020 ONSC 3317 (CanLII)

On the morning of Friday, June 26, 2020 – among more than 20,000 other people – I tuned into the YouTube live stream on which Ontario Superior Court Justice Joseph DiLuca gave his judgment in the criminal trials of Michael and Christian Theriault (R v Theriault, 2020 ONSC 3317 (CanLII)). The brothers, one of whom is a Toronto police officer, stood accused of assault and aggravated assault on Dafonte Miller, a young Black man, who lost his eye in their clash.

Const. Michael Theriault was acquitted of aggravated assault and attempting to obstruct justice in the case, and was convicted only of the lesser charge of simple assault. His brother Christian Theriault was acquitted of all charges. On August 6, 2020, it was announced that the Crown has appealed the acquittals.

The Theriault acquittals unsettled me – persistently, in the weeks to follow. The accused were acquitted of aggravated assault, despite strong Crown evidence, and fact findings of the court, that the two grown white men had gratuitously and violently beaten Miller, a Black teenager. Nearly as unsettling was the fact that the trial judge had insisted, capably, and with sophistication, that he understood what he called the “racialized context” of the encounter (at para 11). The objective of this post is to explore the apparent contradiction in Theriault between the verdicts, on one hand, and Justice DiLuca’s claim that he considered the racialized context, on the other. This post does not purport to be an appellate brief for the Crown, although some argument relates to potential legal and factual errors in Theriault.

Sex Offender Registries and Persons Found Not Criminally Responsible: Exit Ramps and Equality

By Jennifer Koshan

On June 1, 2020

In Constitutional, Equality

By: Jennifer Koshan and Joe Koshan

PDF Version: Sex Offender Registries and Persons Found Not Criminally Responsible: Exit Ramps and Equality

Case Commented On: G. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 264 (CanLII); leave to appeal granted, 2019 CanLII 89651 (SCC)

On February 20, 2020, we had the opportunity to watch the Supreme Court of Canada hearing in G. v. Ontario (Attorney General) in Ottawa (webcast available here). The Supreme Court was closed to public hearings in mid-March as a result of COVID-19, and we feel very fortunate to have had the chance to attend this hearing in person.

The case concerns the issue of whether the provincial and federal sex offender registries created by Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender Registry), 2000, SO 2000, c 1 and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, SC 2004, c 10 (SOIRA) violate the Charter rights of persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD). The Charter claimant, G, was found NCRMD on two counts of sexual assault, one count of unlawful confinement, and one count of harassment against his then-wife in June 2002. He received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board (the body responsible for handling cases of persons found NCRMD) in August 2003. Despite this discharge, G was required to register with the Ontario and federal sex offender registries and was subject to their requirements for life. Persons who are found NCRMD have no ability to remove themselves from the Ontario registry at any point and can only apply for removal from the federal registry after 20 years. However, persons who are found guilty of sexual offences but receive a discharge at the time of sentencing are not required to register either provincially or federally, and persons who are convicted of sexual offences and later receive a pardon or record suspension may have their names deleted from the provincial registry. Neither option is available to persons found NCRMD.