Category: Equality Page 2 of 5

Democratic Charter Rights and First-Past-The-Post: A Shallow Conception of Democracy at the Ontario Court of Appeal

On September 26, 2025

In Constitutional, Election/Voting, Equality

Case Commented On: Fair Voting BC v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 581

PDF Version: Democratic Charter Rights and First-Past-The-Post: A Shallow Conception of Democracy at the Ontario Court of Appeal

Despite many Canadians’ dissatisfaction with our current first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) election system, every attempt at reform so far has failed. The failed political attempts include the 2015 Liberal Party campaign promise to reform FPTP (at 27) and later abandonment of reform efforts, as well as the unsuccessful referendums in BC. A previous Charter-based challenge to the provincial system in Québec was dismissed in Daoust v Québec (Directeur general des élections), 2011 QCCA 1634. As of last month, the Charter challenge brought by Fair Voting BC and Springtide Collective for Democratic Society (collectively, the “Applicants”) is no exception. I will begin my commentary on Fair Voting BC v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 581 (Fair Voting BC )by providing a summary of the Applicant’s claim, as well as some background on FPTP or single member plurality (SMP), compared to the proportional representation (PR) system advocated for by the Applicants. I will then review the majority decision in Fair Voting BC, highlighting what I believe to be a narrow and impoverished view of democratic rights under the Charter and the more balanced approach taken by Justice Dawe in his concurring reasons. I will conclude by emphasizing both the difficulty and the importance of judicial protection of democratic rights. Judicial restraint is commendable, and indeed essential, to protect the ideal of a free and democratic society. However, interpreting the right to vote as being limited to the mere ability to cast a ballot, as the majority does, risks abdicating the judicial responsibility to protect the foundation upon which the entire democratic system is premised.

Charter Sections 15 and 25: The Majority Judgment in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation and its Application in the Federal Court

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On August 29, 2025

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Equality, Indigenous

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton, Robert Hamilton, and Jennifer Koshan

Cases Commented On: Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII); Houle v Swan River First Nation, 2025 FC 267 (CanLII); Donald-Potskin v Sawridge First Nation, 2025 FC 648 (CanLII); Cunningham v Sucker Creek First Nation 150A, 2025 FC 1174 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Charter Sections 15 and 25: The Majority Judgment in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation and its Application in the Federal Court

This is the third in a series of four ABlawg posts on the Supreme Court of Canada’s complex decision in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII). The first post examined the extent to which various factions of the Court referenced the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the second post analyzed their handling of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applied in this context. In this post, we explore another issue on which there was serious disagreement amongst members of the Court. Having found that the Charter applied to the Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation’s (VGFN) residency requirement for Council elections, the majority (Justices Nicolas Kasirer and Mahmud Jamal, with Chief Justice Richard Wagner and Justice Suzanne Côté concurring) and dissenting justices (Justices Sheilah Martin and Michelle O’Bonsawin) ruled on how to approach the interplay between sections 15(1) and 25 of the Charter. We look at the majority judgment and three recent decisions applying the majority’s approach to section 25, also in cases involving First Nations elections: Houle v Swan River First Nation, 2025 FC 267 (CanLII) (Houle), Donald-Potskin v Sawridge First Nation, 2025 FC 648 (CanLII)) (Donald-Potskin), and Cunningham v Sucker Creek First Nation 150A, 2025 FC 1174 (CanLII). The fourth post in this series will focus on the dissenting judgment of Martin and O’Bonsawin JJ on the interplay between sections 15(1) and 25.

New Standards (or is it a Book Ban?) in Alberta K-12 Schools

By Shaun Fluker

On July 15, 2025

In Administrative Law, Education, Equality, Youth and the Law

By: Shaun Fluker

Order Commented On: Ministerial Order 030/2025 (Education and Childcare)

PDF Version: New Standards (or is it a Book Ban?) in Alberta K-12 Schools

On July 4, 2025, Education and Childcare Minister Demetrios Nicolaides issued Ministerial Order 030/2025 prohibiting the inclusion of library materials with prescribed sexual content in K-12 schools. The Minister’s statement that this is about school standards and not a book ban, as reported by CBC News here, is simply not reconcilable with the written terms of his Order, as explained in this post.

Myths, Stereotypes, and Substantive Equality

By Jennifer Koshan

On November 29, 2024

In Equality

By: Jennifer Koshan

Case Commented On: R v Kruk, 2024 SCC 7 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Myths, Stereotypes, and Substantive Equality

Canada’s legal frameworks related to substantive equality and sexual assault law have led to a robust body of jurisprudence on myths and stereotypes about sexual violence. The Supreme Court of Canada first used the language of myths and stereotypes in R v Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 852. In Lavallee, Justice Bertha Wilson repudiated the myth that real victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) will leave their abusers, noting that there are many reasons why women may be unable to do so. A year later, the Court identified several myths and stereotypes about sexual assault, including the “twin myths” that women with a sexual history are more likely to have consented to the alleged sexual activity or that they are less worthy of belief (see R v Seaboyer, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 SCR 577; most recently see R v TWW, 2024 SCC 19 (CanLII)). In the decades since, numerous myths and stereotypes about gender-based violence (GBV) have been debunked by the Supreme Court (see here), and in cases where such misconceptions have infected trial decisions, errors of law have been found on appeal.

An Open Letter to Premier Danielle Smith Re: “Preserving choice for children and youth” Announcement

By Admin

On February 15, 2024

In Constitutional, Equality, Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion, Youth and the Law

Matter Commented On: Government of Alberta, News Release, “Preserving choice for children and youth” (1 February 2024)

PDF Version: An Open Letter to Premier Danielle Smith Re: “Preserving choice for children and youth” Announcement

Editor’s Note:

This post is a reproduction of a letter sent by faculty members, legal researchers, and staff at the University of Alberta and University of Calgary Faculties of Law to the Premier of Alberta regarding the government’s announcement of restrictions targeting transgender youth.

Premier Danielle Smith
Office of the Premier
307 Legislature Building
10800 – 97 Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta
T5K 2B6

By email: premier@gov.ab.ca

12 February 2024

Dear Premier Smith:

Re: “Preserving choice for children and youth” announcement

We are faculty members, legal researchers, and staff at the University of Alberta and University of Calgary Faculties of Law. We have come together to express our deep concerns with the government’s announcement of restrictions targeting transgender youth. These restrictions will harm Two-Spirit, trans, and gender diverse children and youth by undermining their education, restricting their access to healthcare, and narrowing their sport and recreation opportunities. We believe these restrictions violate their rights, as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).