Category: Human Rights Page 6 of 32

The Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach to the Charter’s Equality Guarantee in its Pay Equity Decisions

Case Commented On: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 SCC 17 (CanLII); Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 18 (CanLII)

The latest decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada on s 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are the two companion pay equity decisions rendered May 24, 2018 in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 SCC 17 (CanLII) (APP) and Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 18 (CanLII) (CSQ). The analysis of the Charter’s s 15(1) prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex and s 15(2) protection of ameliorative programs from charges of reverse discrimination – the two-case, five-judgment spanning focus of this post – reveals a seriously fractured court reminiscent of the court that decided the so-called “equality trilogy” of the mid-1990s. It reveals the lack of consensus at the end of Beverley McLachlin’s term as Chief Justice and after a significant turnover in members in the past four years, with the three most recently appointed judges who heard these appeals dissenting. The issues this post addresses – and we address them only briefly in this forum – are: (1) What is the current legal test for discerning a breach of s 15? (2) What are the contentious points on which the current justices disagree? And (3) What might these pay equity decisions mean for the future of equality law in general? Unfortunately, there is enough disagreement about the answers to the first two questions that this lengthy post will only discuss the relevant law and not go into detail on its application to the facts in this case (except in the use of comparators).

An earlier ABlawg post by Jennifer Koshan, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Pay Equity Decisions: A Call to Action for Alberta?, explores the implications of these two decisions for the Alberta government’s pay equity obligations. The context and facts of both decisions are detailed in that post, but a brief recap to set the stage for the s 15 analysis is in order.

Protecting the Public Interest: Law Society Decision-Making After Trinity Western University

By Alice Woolley

On July 6, 2018

In Constitutional, Human Rights, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Alice Woolley and Amy Salyzyn

PDF Version: Protecting the Public Interest: Law Society Decision-Making After Trinity Western University

Cases Commented On: Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (CanLII); Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33 (CanLII).

Introduction

Canadian law societies strive to regulate lawyers and legal services in the public interest. Courts emphasize the law societies’ broad discretion to determine what the public interest requires in governing the profession and, accordingly, defer to the law societies’ exercise of that discretion (See Malcolm Mercer’s analysis of this on slaw.ca).

Courts defer to law societies because they accept the underlying rationale for law societies’ power and responsibility. Courts recognize the importance of the independence of the bar, and view self-regulation (of lawyers by lawyers) as an appropriate mechanism for ensuring that independence (This view is problematic but widely accepted – see, e.g., Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University 2018 SCC 32 (“LSBC v TWU”) at para. 37). Courts view serving the public interest as something law societies must pursue in exchange for the privilege of self-regulation (LSBC v TWU at para 32) but simultaneously identify self-regulation as likely to ensure protection of the public interest given law societies’ “particular expertise and sensitivity to the conditions of practice” (LSBC v TWU at para. 37). Briefly (albeit circularly), courts assert that they defer to law societies because independence of the bar requires self-regulation; self-regulation requires law societies to act in the public interest; and self-regulation effectively protects the public interest because of law societies’ institutional expertise.

This blog post raises questions about whether current law society policy-making structures can effectively consider and advance the public interest. In particular, and in light of the saga of Canadian law societies’ consideration of TWU’s attempt to open a law school, it considers whether law societies can fulfill their mandate to regulate in the public interest when benchers make policy decisions in hard cases.

Barring Claims Against Discriminatory Legislation: Canada v Canada

By Elysa Darling

On June 29, 2018

In Aboriginal, Human Rights

By: Elysa Darling and Drew Lafond

PDF Version: Barring Claims Against Discriminatory Legislation: Canada v Canada

Case Commented On: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 (Can LII)

Two weeks ago, in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission v Canada (Attorney General) (CHRC v AG), the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) that direct challenges to legislation cannot be pursued under section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 (the CHRA). The claimants in this case argued that they were discriminated against under section 6 of the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5 and filed a complaint under section 5 of the CHRA asking the CHRT to render inoperative the offending provisions in the Indian Act. The decision of the CHRT, with which the Court agreed, was that a complaint under the CHRA cannot be used to directly challenge legislation on the basis that it is discriminatory.

Is Non-denominational Education a Secularism Principle or a Violation of Human Rights Law?

By Hasna Shireen

On June 27, 2018

In Administrative Law, Human Rights

By: Hasna Shireen and Linda McKay-Panos

PDF Version: Is Non-denominational Education a Secularism Principle or a Violation of Human Rights Law?

Case Commented On: Webber Academy Foundation v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2018 ABCA 207 (CanLII)

In 2015, the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal (AHRT) found that a private school in Calgary (Webber Academy) had unlawfully discriminated against two Muslim high school students by prohibiting them from performing certain prescribed Sunni prayers on the school campus. The AHRT awarded the students $12,000 and $14,000 respectively as damages for distress, injury and loss of dignity (see 2015 AHRC 8 (CanLII)). The Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (per Justice G.H. Poelman) upheld that decision (see 2016 ABQB 442 (CanLII), and see the ABlawg post on this decision). Webber Academy appealed the decision to the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA), adding new constitutional issues. The Court of Appeal (per Justices Jack Watson, Patricia Rowbotham, and JD Bruce MacDonald) sent the matter back to the AHRT for re-determination after it has heard appropriate evidence and argument on all the issues. The ABCA held that the AHRT was better placed to make the necessary findings of fact, mixed fact and law, or questions of law alone that were within its jurisdiction. The ABCA noted that there may be remaining discrete issues under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, such as the constitutionality of s 4 of the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5 (AHRA), which prohibits discrimination in services customarily available to the public, including education. The ABCA ordered a new hearing with a new panel of the Tribunal, and the AHRT was ordered to refer any Charter questions by way of a stated case to the Court of Queen’s Bench for resolution. (Webber at para 52).

The Supreme Court of Canada’s Pay Equity Decisions: A Call to Action for Alberta?

By Jennifer Koshan

On June 22, 2018

In Constitutional, Human Rights

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Pay Equity Decisions: A Call to Action for Alberta?

Alberta does not have strong pay equity legislation. The Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, only guarantees equal pay to employees of both sexes for “the same or substantially similar work” for the same employer (s 6). Most other Canadian jurisdictions require employers to pay male and female employees equal pay for work of equal value in either human rights legislation (see e.g. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 11; Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c C-12, s 19) and / or in stand alone pay equity legislation (see e.g. Quebec’s Pay Equity Act, RSQ 1996, c 43, which applies to public and private employers, and Prince Edward Island’s Pay Equity Act, RSPEI 1988, c P-2, which applies to the public sector), or they have pay equity negotiating frameworks for some public sector employees (see here). Not unexpectedly, a 2016 Parkland Institute report written by Kathleen Lahey found that Alberta has the largest gender income gap in Canada at 41%, a gap which is often larger for women who are racialized (including Indigenous women) or have disabilities (at 21). The report recommended that Alberta design “robust” pay equity legislation “capable of significantly improving the economic status of women in Alberta” (at 2, 3).

Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions shed some light on whether Alberta is constitutionally obliged to enact more robust pay equity legislation (see Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 SCC 17 (CanLII) (Alliance du personnel professionnel); Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 18 (CanLII) (Centrale des syndicats)). This post will explore the implications of these decisions for the government’s pay equity obligations in Alberta. A future post with Jonnette Watson Hamilton will discuss in more detail the Court’s approach to equality rights under s 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in these cases.