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Decrypting Bill C-22, Part 2: Keeping Tabs: C-22 and the Year (Now Half-Year) of Metadata Retention

By: Alexandra Lyn, Joel Reardon, and Michael Nesbitt

Legislation Commented On: Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access, 1st Sess, 45th Parl, 2026 (as passed by the House of Commons 18 June 2026)

PDF Version: Decrypting Bill C-22, Part 2: Keeping Tabs: C-22 and the Year (Now Half-Year) of Metadata Retention

This is the second post in our four-part series that translates the ongoing debate over Bill C-22 for non-technical and non-legal readers. The first post introduced Bill C-22 and provided background information to help understand the justifications and criticisms of the Bill, including a brief primer on the legal concept of “lawful access” and search and seizure law under section 8 of the Charter, which readers may wish to review as it forms a backdrop to this blog post. Part I can be found here. In that post, we promised three subsequent blog posts on three core criticisms of Bill C-22. This installment tackles one of the most far-reaching of those three core criticisms of Bill C-22: the Bill’s mandatory metadata retention provisions.

Intimate Image Abuse in the Age of Deepfakes: Reforming Alberta’s Civil Legislation: Part 2

By: Emma Marck

Case/Decision/Legislation/Bill Commented On: Protecting Victims of Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act, SA 2017, c P-26.9

PDF Version: Intimate Image Abuse in the Age of Deepfakes: Reforming Alberta’s Civil Legislation: Part 2

The Canadian Centre for Child Protection reported that non-consensual distribution of intimate images (NCDII) involving Canadian youth increased by approximately 21% between 2024 and 2025, from 436 to 527. Despite the growing prevalence of intimate image abuse, Alberta does not provide a dedicated process for obtaining an expedited intimate image protection order or expressly authorize orders requiring online platforms to remove intimate images. Victims seeking protective relief must instead navigate ordinary civil proceedings or pursue voluntary removal through online platforms.

Intimate Image Abuse in the Age of Deepfakes: Reforming Alberta’s Civil Legislation: Part 1

By: Emma Marck

Legislation Commented On: Protecting Victims of Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act, SA 2017, c P-26.9

PDF Version: Intimate Image Abuse in the Age of Deepfakes: Reforming Alberta’s Civil Legislation: Part 1

One in ten American teenagers personally knows someone who has had deepfake non-consensual intimate images (DNCII) of them created, and 6% reported having been victimized by DNCII (Thorn, Deepfake Nudes & Young People: Navigating a New Frontier in Technology-Facilitated Nonconsensual Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (Thorn: 2025) at 14). Recent incidents in Alberta demonstrate why intimate image legislation must address DNCII and its online distribution. In December 2025, a Calgary teen was charged in relation to DNCII of students from several schools. Six months later, two Edmonton boys were charged after creating and sharing DNCII of classmates. Reported consequences include job loss, school expulsion, post-traumatic stress disorder, and, in some cases, death by suicide (Mary Anne Franks, “‘Revenge Porn’ Reform: A View from the Front Lines” (2017) 69:5 Florida L Rev 1251 at 1259, 1263).

Democracy Watch and its Implications for the Practice of Channeling Limited Judicial Supervision to Appellate Courts

By: Nigel Bankes

Matter Commented On: Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 28 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Democracy Watch and its Implications for the Practice of Channeling Limited Judicial Supervision to Appellate Courts

This post assesses the implications of the Supreme Court’s unanimous and important decision in Democracy Watch for those many scenarios in which a provincial legislature channels some part, but only some part, of the judicial supervision of a regulatory tribunal to the province’s appellate courts. The drafting technique, at least in Alberta, is quite consistent. Step one, make provision for an appeal of a decision of a regulator to the Court of Appeal with a short limitation period; step two, confine that appeal to points of law or jurisdiction (i.e. no appeal on findings of fact or mixed findings of law and fact); step three, stipulate that the appeal is not as of right, but is subject to a leave or permission to appeal application; step four, confirm, by way of a broadly drafted privative clause, that the usual avenues for judicial review in the Court of King’s Bench are foreclosed.

Decrypting Bill C-22, Part I: Why Canada Needs a Lawful Access Regime

By: Alexandra Lyn, Joel Reardon, and Michael Nesbitt

Legislation Commented On: Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access (1st Sess, 45th Parl, 2026)

PDF Version: Decrypting Bill C-22, Part I: Why Canada Needs a Lawful Access Regime

Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access (1st Sess, 45th Parl, 2026) is the federal government’s long-overdue and contentious attempt to address the intractable issue of lawful access. C-22 has cleared the House and is awaiting Senate study beginning on September 21, 2026, having been fast-tracked through third reading despite ongoing privacy, encryption, and overbreadth objections.  The Bill has two parts. Part 1, Timely Access to Data and Information, governs law enforcement access to personal information held by communication service providers (think Bell, Rogers, Telus) and other tech companies and services like Signal, Gmail, and WhatsApp, by amending the Criminal Code and several related statutes. Part 2 enacts the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA), which establishes a framework that requires electronic service providers to facilitate lawful access requests under the Criminal Code or the CSIS Act. Framed by the government as a response to criminal activity increasingly enabled by the digital environment, the Bill expands the state’s powers of search and seizure by conscripting private providers into its investigative apparatus — for example by requiring them, among other things, to retain user metadata that may not otherwise be preserved, and to develop technical capabilities that would otherwise not exist, so that law enforcement can access the data these providers hold. These expanded powers lie in tension with civil liberties and the privacy interests Canadians hold in their digital lives, interests protected by section 8 of the Charter. Bill C-22 asks Canadians to decide a question that has become increasingly pressing in a digital world: in the pursuit of public safety, how much of our privacy are we prepared to relinquish, to whom, and at what cost?

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