Category: Oil & Gas Page 22 of 54

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Tolling Methodologies On Federally Regulated Pipelines In Northeast British Columbia

Matters Commented On: (1) National Energy Board (NEB), Letter decision on the Application of Westcoast Energy Inc for Review of the Decision of Members Ballem and Lytle, in Report GH-003-2015 (Towerbirch Report), Respecting the Toll Treatment of the Tower Lake Section (TLS), and (2) NEB letter to NOVA Gas Transmission Ltd (NGTL), Westcoast Energy Inc (Westcoast) and Alliance Pipeline Ltd (Alliance), re Examination to Determine Whether to Undertake an Inquiry of the Tolling Methodologies, Tariff Provisions and Competition in Northeast BC, 16 March 2017 (the Tolling Methodology Process Letter).

Northeast British Columbia is an area of expanding natural gas production due to a number of significant shale gas plays in the area including Horn River, Liard, and Montney.

Historically this area of the province was first served for conventional sour gas production by Westcoast Transmission. Westcoast offered producers a bundled service including sour gas processing as well as mainline transmission down to the lower mainland and on to serve markets in the Pacific Northwest. This entire system has long been federally regulated by the National Energy Board (NEB), a practice that was legally and constitutionally confirmed by the majority judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] 1 SCR 322, 1998 CanLII 813 (SCC). More recently the area has also come to be served by Alliance’s “bullet pipeline” and by extension of the NGTL system from Alberta into BC. The Alliance Pipeline is a point-to-point pipeline which transports liquids rich gas from this area and northwest Alberta to the Chicago market hub. Alliance came on stream in 2000. Its construction was backed by 15 year contracts. Few shippers elected to renew and “accordingly, Alliance developed its New Services Offering (NSO), which incorporated new services and tolling methodologies on the pipeline. Alliance applied for Board approval of the NSO in 2014.” The Board’s Reasons for Decision on that matter (RH-002-2014) are available here. The NGTL system is the old NOVA intraprovincial transmission system which began life in the 1950s under the name Alberta Gas Trunk Line (AGTL) and subsequently morphed into NOVA before merging with TransCanada PipeLines (TCPL) in 1998. Historically, AGTL and NOVA were provincially regulated until brought under federal regulation in 2009: see ABlawg post here. The AGTL\NOVA business model was quite different from that of Westcoast. NOVA focused its attention on the transmission system and left the producers to assume responsibility for owning and constructing in-field processing facilities to produce pipeline quality gas for delivery to the AGTL\NOVA system.

The result of these developments is that the natural gas transmission scene in northeast BC no longer looks like a natural monopoly, and has not for some long time. Instead, there is competition for natural gas production and competition to fill transmission systems with gas. No pipeline system feels this more acutely than the NGTL system and its sister, the TCPL mainline, which needs additional volumes of gas to make up for the declines in conventional gas production in the western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB).

Independent Operations, Holdings and Common Ownership: A Letter Decision of the Alberta Energy Regulator

By Nigel Bankes

On February 21, 2017

In Energy, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes and Heather Lilles

PDF Version: Independent Operations, Holdings and Common Ownership: A Letter Decision of the Alberta Energy Regulator

Decision Commented On: AER, Request for Regulatory Appeal by Westbrick Energy Ltd., Regulatory Appeal No. 1852713, 25 May 2016

Last week, ABlawg announced a new three-step project which will present the Alberta Energy Regulator’s (AER’s) published procedural and participatory letter decisions in a more usable and accessible form. As noted in that post, step one of the project, which collates the summaries of these decisions in a searchable PDF document, is now complete.

The objective of this post is to provide an example of the potentially valuable nuggets of information discoverable in this large group of decisions. The post concerns a letter decision which, while ostensibly dealing with procedural matters, also contains discussions of holdings, common ownership and independent operations within the meaning of the 1990 CAPL Operating Procedure. As such, the decision confirms the importance of publishing these decisions insofar as joint operating agreements (JOAs) are common in the industry as is the practice “going penalty”. But the decision also illustrates some confusion between the threshold question of standing and the decision on the merits. In this case it appears to us that the AER panel actually decided the merits of Westbrick’s application and then somewhat perversely denied it standing.

Announcing a New Resource for the Letter Decisions of the Alberta Energy Regulator

By Nigel Bankes

On February 8, 2017

In Energy, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes, Amy Matychuk, and David Rennie

PDF Version: Announcing a New Resource for the Letter Decisions of the Alberta Energy Regulator

Decisions Commented On: The Participatory/Procedural Decisions of the AER

Several years ago now, ABlawg published a series of posts that were critical of the failure of the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) and its predecessor the Energy Resources Conservation Board to publish its letter decisions in a systematic way: see here, here and here. Whether in response to that criticism, or for its own good reasons, the AER began posting what it refers to as participatory/procedural decisions (presumably a sub-set of a broader category of letter decisions) in the fall of 2015. When this venture began, the decisions were simply listed with no attached descriptor whatsoever. Now the AER does provide a brief description of the matter at hand but it is still a laborious task to click and retrieve each document and assess its significance.

Having asked the AER to provide this information it accordingly seemed appropriate to try and present it in a more usable and accessible form. Hence this project. The project has three steps. Step one is to provide a digest of each decision. Given the number of these decisions (already over 170) we have not attempted to synthesise or précis these decisions, rather the exercise has been more of a cut-and-paste job hewing closely to the AER’s actual text. We have added key words which are listed below. There is no additional commentary. The result of that exercise has been collated into a PDF document which is available here and is fully searchable. Step two will be to present this information as a set of web-pages. That is a work in progress. Step three will be to write what we anticipate will become a short annual survey of these decisions, assessing trends and perhaps highlighting some of the more important decisions. That too is a work in progress. It goes without saying that while step one is complete until the end of January 2017 we also aim to populate it with new decisions from time to time.

David Rennie (JD 2017) began this work as a summer student in 2016 preparing digests of the first 85 decisions and Amy Matychuk (JD 2018), also a summer student in 2016, continued the work for the latter part of the summer and through the fall. Nigel Bankes provided direction and supervision.

We hope that readers of ABlawg and other researchers will find this tool useful and we welcome your feedback, either by way of a comment on this post or to ndbankes@ucalgary.ca

The Freedom to Contract Your Terms of Business (aka Spread Costs, Consequential Damages, Knock for Knock and Contract Interpretation Principles)

By Nigel Bankes

On December 27, 2016

In Contracts, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes and Heather Lilles

PDF Version: The Freedom to Contract Your Terms of Business (aka Spread Costs, Consequential Damages, Knock for Knock and Contract Interpretation Principles)

Case Commented On: Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources Plc [2016] EWCA Civ 372, [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 51, 165 Con LR 1, [2016] BLR 360

This decision of the English Court of Appeal (Civil Division) which came out earlier this year (April 2016) is well worth reading both for its treatment of the exclusion of liability for consequential damages and also for its modern approach to the interpretation of commercial contracts. As recognized by the Court, the case “raises some interesting questions about the freedom of two commercial parties to determine the terms on which they wish to do business” (para 1).

Transocean Drilling UK Ltd (Transocean), the owner of a semi-submersible drilling rig, entered into a contract with Providence Resources Plc (Providence) to drill an offshore appraisal well for Providence. On 18 December 2011, Transocean suspended drilling operations due to a misalignment of part of the blow-out preventer. Transocean resumed operations on 2 February 2012. The trial judge determined that the delay was caused by Transocean’s breach of contract. There was no appeal on that point, but Transocean did appeal that part of the judge’s decision in which he allowed Providence to recover the ‘spread costs’ that it had incurred as a result of the delay. The ‘spread costs’ were described (at para 10) as “the costs of personnel, equipment and services contracted [by Providence] from third parties which were wasted as a result of the delay. Examples given by the judge are well logging, well testing and cementing, mud engineers and mud logging services, geological services, diving and ROV (remotely operated vehicle) services, weather services, directional drilling services, and running casings.”

Making Sense of Nonsense? Or Perhaps Not

By Nigel Bankes

On November 25, 2016

In Contracts, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes and Heather Lilles

PDF Version: Making Sense of Nonsense? Or Perhaps Not

Case Commented On: Eon Energy Ltd v Ferrybank Resources Ltd, 2016 ABQB 585 (CanLII)

What happens when two oil and gas companies enter into a joint operating agreement (JOA) to which is attached the 1981 CAPL Operating Procedure and the PASWC Accounting Procedure and then proceed to operate the properties according to a completely different set of arrangements? As one might expect, things are fine for so long as each perceives some benefit from these de facto arrangements. But when relations deteriorate it’s a mess; and then both counsel, and ultimately the Court, have to try and make sense of what has happened. And in this case that evidently proved difficult for all concerned and likely, very, very expensive. The hearing of this case took 16 days and then Justice Kim Nixon took two years to render this judgement. There were also interlocutory injunctive proceedings (unreported) and there will be a series of accounting issues to be addressed as a result of this judgement. The result is extremely unedifying. The judgement is long (53 pages), meandering, fact laden, and convoluted. Perhaps the best that can be said for it is that it might serve as a salutary warning to be used by lawyers acting for junior oil and gas companies: “this is what happens when you make things up as you go along and act as if the written agreement is a mere inconvenience.” The case is also another illustration of the hard reality that co-ownership is a messy business and fundamentally an institution for those who can get along together. Sometimes the costs of maintaining and fighting about the relationship are not worth the benefits to be obtained.

In one of the more enigmatic paragraphs of her decision Justice Nixon suggests that the parties are asking her to re-write their agreement (at para 260 and again at para 397). But the question all along is which agreement? The written agreement? Or the agreement evidenced by the conduct of the parties?

In what follows we will do our best to distill the essential facts and legal reasoning from Justice Nixon’s judgement.