Category: Supreme Court of Canada Page 21 of 22

The Crown has neither the power nor the duty to invest Indian monies: The use of legislation to limit trust duties

The “money management” part of the long-running Samson\Ermineskin Case has now come to a close. A unanimous seven person panel of the Supreme Court of Canada in a judgement authored by Justice Marshall Rothstein has ruled that the Government of Canada is not liable when it fails to invest First Nation royalty monies and instead deposits those monies to the credit of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) and pays the First Nations interest on those monies. In fact, the Court has ruled that the Indian Act makes it illegal for the Crown to invest Indian capital monies. The Court also ruled that the provisions of the Act which require this conclusion do not constitute discrimination within the meaning of s.15 of the Charter.

Supreme Court denies leave to appeal to parents in disinterment case

By Jennifer Koshan

On November 20, 2008

In Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: Johnston v. Alberta (Vital Statistics), 2008 ABCA 188, leave to appeal denied by S.C.C.

PDF Version: Supreme Court denies leave to appeal to parents in disinterment case

On November 13, 2008, Justices Louis LeBel, Marie Deschamps and Louise Charron of the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal to Grace Johnston in a case involving her right to have a say in the disinterment of her son’s remains. No reasons were provided for the Supreme Court’s decision, although it is interesting to note that no costs were awarded against Grace Johnston for pursuing the leave to appeal application. As noted in previous posts on this case, (https://ablawg.ca/2008/01/12/leave-to-intervene-denied-to-metis-nation-in-case-involving-disinterment-of-rcmp/#more-44 and https://ablawg.ca/2008/06/07/disinterment-of-rcmp-officer-may-proceed-despite-parents%E2%80%99-wishes/#more-153), the Alberta Courts upheld the decision of the Director of Vital Statistics under the Cemeteries Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-3, to permit disinterment of Constable Leo Johnston’s remains on the application of his widow Kelly Barsness. Constable Johnston was one of four RCMP officers killed in the line of duty near Mayerthorpe, Alberta in March 2005, and was originally buried in his home town of Lac La Biche. Ms. Barsness’s wish to have Constable Johnston’s remains moved to the special RCMP Cemetery in Saskatchewan can now proceed, in spite of the objections of Grace Johnston, her husband Ronald, and members of the Métis community who were denied any standing in the case.

Recent Developments in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute

By Jennifer Koshan

On November 17, 2008

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Human Rights, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases considered: Tsuu T’ina Nation v. Bearchief, 2008 CanLII 55966 (S.C.C.)

PDF Version: Recent Developments in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute

As noted in my previous post on Tsuu T’ina Nation v. Bearchief, the Tsuu T’ina Nation was effectively prevented from enforcing an eviction notice against residents of Black Bear Crossing (BBC) whose band membership was disputed, until such time as the membership of the residents was resolved. The Tsuu T’ina’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Justices Morris Fish and Marshall Rothstein on October 30, 2008 (with costs against the Tsuu T’ina Nation).

The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious “inherent” probabilities or improbabilities

By Brett Code, Q.C.

On November 13, 2008

In Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53

PDF Version: The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious “inherent” probabilities or improbabilities

* Brett Code acknowledges the able assistance of Shankar Kamath, a student-at-law at Bennett Jones LLP.

In F.H. v. McDougall, released October 2, 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that there is only one standard of proof in a civil case: proof on a balance of probabilities. A mixed series of cases over the last 50 years had caused uncertainty as to the applicable standard of proof when trying allegations of morally blameworthy conduct, for example, of fraud, of sexual assault in the civil context or of dishonesty in the context of professional conduct by lawyers (see for example Bater v. Bater, [1950] 2 All E.R. 458 at 459 (C.A., Lord Denning); H.F. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] B.C.J. No. 436, 2002 BCSC 325 at para 154; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138; Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 164 at 169-171). What had evolved was an apparently sliding scale, sometimes requiring plaintiffs to meet a higher standard of proof, a standard often said to be commensurate with the occasion. That uncertainty is now resolved, perhaps finally.

Leave to appeal refused by Supreme Court in Drug Testing Case

By Jennifer Koshan

On June 3, 2008

In Human Rights, Labour/Employment, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: Director of the Alberta Human Rights and Citzenship Commission, et al. v. Kellogg Brown & Root (Canada) Company, 2007 ABCA 426

In the May 29, 2008 version of his S.C.C. L@wletter Eugene Meehan reports that the Supreme Court of Canada has dismissed the application of the Director of the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission for leave to appeal in the case of Kellogg Brown & Root (Canada) Company (at the time of writing the SCC’s decision on leave to appeal is not yet available on its website). For posts on the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in this case, see Linda McKay Panos, “Court of Appeal Sends Court of Queen’s Bench Decision to Rehab” and David Corry, “Drug Testing: A Wake-up Call to the Courts ”. Linda and David disagreed about the correctness of the Alberta Court of Appeal’s approach, which overturned the decision of Madam Justice Sheilah Martin and upheld the position of the employer. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court will not take advantage of the opportunity to clarify the law in this area. This leaves it uncertain for employers, employees and human rights tribunals whether perceived addiction to alcohol and drugs is covered by human rights legislation, and in what circumstances employers are entitled to implement drug and alcohol testing policies without running afoul of human rights legislation.