ABLawg

ABlawg: Year in Review 2018

On December 28, 2018

By: Admin

PDF Version: ABlawg: Year in Review 2018

2018 was a notable year for ABlawg as we celebrated our tenth anniversary in February. ABlawg also received its first cite by the Supreme Court of Canada, with the Supreme Court citing Nigel Bankes’ post, The Duty to Consult and the Legislative Process: But What About Reconciliation?, in Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40 at para 51. This year also saw ABlawg publish its largest series of posts on a single topic, with 13 posts contributing to the debate on Bills C-68 and C-69 which purport to overhaul the National Energy Board, the federal environmental impact assessment regime, and several other pieces of the federal environmental legislative framework.

Court of Queen’s Bench Requires Vexatious Litigant to Seek Court’s Permission Before Accessing Any Non-Judicial Body

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On December 21, 2018

In Vexatious Litigants

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Court of Queen’s Bench Requires Vexatious Litigant to Seek Court’s Permission Before Accessing Any Non-Judicial Body

Case Commented On: Makis v Alberta Health Services, 2018 ABQB 976

In many written decisions rendered over the past two years, some judges of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta have been rather disdainful of the vexatious litigant procedures added to the Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2 in 2007, referring to them, for example, as “obsolete and inferior” (Gagnon v Shoppers Drug Mart, 2018 ABQB 888 at para 14). Although the Judicature Act procedures continue to be used in rare cases (e.g. HRMT v SNS, 2018 ABQB 843 at para 102), the Court usually makes it clear that it prefers its own two-step “modern” process – introduced in Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 – which they justify as an exercise of a superior court’s inherent jurisdiction. The use of their inherent jurisdiction is said to provide “a more robust, functional, and efficient response to control of problematic litigants” (Templanza v Ford, 2018 ABQB 168 at para 103; Hill v Bundon, 2018 ABQB 506 at para 53). The Judicature Act procedure requires “persistent” bad behavior by a litigant before that litigant’s access to the courts can be restricted (s 23(2)), usually by requiring the litigant to obtain the court’s permission before starting a new court action. The Court of Queen’s Bench does not want to wait for persistent vexatious conduct (Templanza at para 101; 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 49-50). The legislated procedure also requires notice to the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General (s 23.1(1)), who has a right to appear and be heard in person (s. 23.1(3)), a requirement that suggests how seriously our elected representatives saw restrictions on court access when they added the vexatious litigant procedures to the Act in 2007. The court-fashioned process does not usually require notice to anyone except the person about to be found to be a vexatious litigant, and it has become a written-submissions-only process – no one has the right to appear and be heard in person. The usual restrictions on court access are now characterized as a “very modest imposition” (Knutson (Re), 2018 ABQB 858 at para 42). As this brief summary suggests, the changes made to this area of the law over the past two years have been fairly dramatic. But the Court of Queens’ Bench has now pushed the envelope, extending their inherent jurisdiction even further. In Makis v Alberta Health Services, their inherent jurisdiction is used to control access by a litigant found to be vexatious to non-judicial bodies, i.e. administrative tribunals and other statutory decision-makers.

Market power in the electricity sector prior to the implementation of a capacity market

By Nigel Bankes

On December 18, 2018

In Energy

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Market power in the electricity sector prior to the implementation of a capacity market

Report commented on: Charles River Associates, Offer Behaviour Guidelines prior to the implementation of a capacity market, Report Prepared for the Market Surveillance Administrator, December 18, 2018

On September 27, 2018, Alberta’s Market Surveillance Administrator (MSA) provided notice that it was starting a process to determine if it needed to adopt guidelines for market participants in the electricity sector in Alberta during the period prior to the implementation of a capacity market. It will be recalled that the MSA had a set of Offer Behaviour Enforcement Guidelines (OBEG) that were in force until withdrawn by the MSA with the announced advent of a capacity market. For an earlier post referring to the development see here and for discussion of the transition to an energy plus capacity market see here.

To initiate this process the MSA retained Charles River Associates (CRA) to address three questions:

Could there be a problem with offer behaviour that would need to be addressed during the transition period?
If so, could the problem identified be addressed in whole, or in part, through MSA guidelines and what form could those guidelines take?
If guidelines were made and market participants did not follow those guidelines what remedies should the MSA seek from the Alberta Utilities Commission (“Commission”) in an enforcement proceeding?

The MSA has now received that report and this post summarizes some of its key findings.

The Duty of a Regulated Pipeline to Provide Facilities

By Nigel Bankes

On December 17, 2018

In Energy

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Duty of a Regulated Pipeline to Provide Facilities

Case Commented On: National Energy Board, Letter Decision, 4 December 2018, Nipigon LNG Corporation (NLNG) Application pursuant to Section 12, Section 13, Section 59, Subsection 71(2), Subsection 71(3) and Part IV of the National Energy Board Act (NEB Act) in respect of TransCanada PipeLines Limited (TransCanada) and the TransCanada Mainline pipeline system (the TransCanada Mainline).

Public utility statutes typically require a public utility to provide service on a non-discriminatory basis to persons within its exclusive franchise area. This is also the common law duty of a common carrier. But what if a regulated utility does not have a franchise area (e.g. TransCanada PipeLines, see for example the comments of the National Energy Board in its TCPL Restructuring Decision RH-003-2011, at 38); and what if the utility is not a common carrier (e.g. a federally regulated natural gas pipeline)?

Severing a joint tenancy in Alberta

By Nigel Bankes

On December 14, 2018

In Property

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Severing a joint tenancy in Alberta

Case Commented On: Dobransky v Roteliuk, 2018 ABQB 660 and Smilley v McMillan, 2018 ABQB 988.

Co-owners in Alberta may choose to hold an estate in land as joint tenants or as tenants in common: Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c L-7, sections 4 and 5 (LPA). A joint tenancy carries with it the incident of survivorship – that is, the right of the surviving joint tenant to the entire estate. Despite the fact that there is a presumption in favour of a tenancy in common and that therefore co-owners must indicate expressly that they wish to own as joint tenants and not as tenants in common (LPA, section 8), there is general agreement (and this was certainly the position of courts of equity) that it should be easy to destroy or sever the joint tenancy thereby avoiding the incident of survivorship. This post sets out the law of severance and then comments on two recent decisions in each of which the plaintiff sought to get the Court’s assistance to complete a severance.