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The “Historic” Paris Climate Agreement: What It Means “At Home” for Canada and the Alberta Oil Sands

On December 18, 2015

In Climate Change, Environmental, International Law

By: Sharon Mascher

PDF Version: The “Historic” Paris Climate Agreement: What It Means “At Home” for Canada and the Alberta Oil Sands

Matter Commented On: Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

On Saturday December 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius declared consensus and gavelled the Paris Agreement. While far from perfect, the Agreement is being hailed by many around the world as historic (see for example here, here and here). Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is no exception, labeling the agreement “historic, ambitious and balanced” in a Statement issued following the conclusion of the Paris climate conference. The Statement goes on to say “[t]ogether with our international partners, we agreed to strengthen the global response to limit global average temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius as well as pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees”. This is indeed historic as, in so doing, the international community agreed for the first time to increase the level of ambition beyond the 2°C maximum that has prevailed to date (see COP 16 Decision 1/CP.16). There is now a clear commitment within the Paris Agreement to hold temperatures to well below 2°C, and a more aspirational target to pursue a limit of 1.5 °C.

BC Court Confirms That a Municipality Has No Authority With Respect to the Routing of an Interprovincial Pipeline

By Nigel Bankes

On December 17, 2015

In Constitutional, Energy, Natural Resources, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: BC Court Confirms That a Municipality Has No Authority With Respect to the Routing of an Interprovincial Pipeline

Case Commented On: Burnaby (City) v Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC, 2015 BCSC 2140

The Trans Mountain Expansion Project is still before the National Energy Board (NEB) (see the comment by Kirk Lambrecht QC here) and all the while spawning lots of litigation, some in the Federal Court of Appeal and some in the provincial superior courts. I have commented on most of that litigation in “Pipelines, the National Energy Board and the Federal Court” (2015), 3 Energy Regulation Quarterly 59 – 73.

In this most recent case the City of Burnaby was trying to get the support of the Supreme Court of British Columbia for an issue that it had already lost before the NEB and which, to put it in neutral terms, had failed to attract the interest of the Federal Court of Appeal. To review the facts briefly, TM as part of its expansion proposals, was considering alternative routing for its pipeline through Burnaby Mountain. In order to assess that route it required access to the relevant lands to carry out geotechnical and other studies. The City of Burnaby actively opposed the expansion project and served notices on TM’s contractors alleging violation of various Burnaby by-laws. That led TM to seek a ruling from the NEB confirming that the Board had the jurisdiction to authorize TM’s activities, and, to the extent that Burnaby’s by-laws were making it impossible for TM to carry out the necessary tests, a ruling that the by-laws were constitutionally inapplicable, or if not inapplicable, were in conflict with the provisions of the National Energy Board Act and therefore inoperative on the basis of the paramountcy doctrine. The Board provided that ruling in its well-reasoned Ruling No. 40. The Federal Court of Appeal denied leave without giving reasons, a practice that I have criticized in earlier posts here and here.

Adieu à la Langue Française

By Theresa Yurkewich

On December 16, 2015

In Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Theresa Yurkewich

PDF Version: Adieu à la Langue Française

Case Commented On: Caron v Alberta, 2015 SCC 56

Introduction

Gilles Caron and Pierre Boutet, the appellants, were charged with traffic offences under section 34(2) of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation, Alta. Reg. 304/2002 and sections 160(1) and 115(2) of the Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6. Both pieces of legislation were written and published solely in English, as permitted by Alberta’s Languages Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-6. Mr. Caron and Mr. Boutet, however, argued that by enacting legislation solely in English, the Alberta legislature was acting contrary to the constitutional obligation of legislative bilingualism (i.e. the duty to enact in both English and French). Mr. Caron and Mr. Boutet, therefore, argued that both pieces of legislation should be held inoperative to the extent they violate this principle.

As framed by the Court, the issue presented was “whether the Languages Act is ultra vires or inoperative insofar as it abrogates a constitutional duty owed by Alberta to enact, print, and publish its laws in English and in French.” The trial judge at the Provincial Court of Alberta answered this question in the affirmative (2008 ABPC 232), but this decision was reversed by the Court of Queen’s Bench (2009 ABQB 745), and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the appellants (2014 ABCA 71).

The Next Shot in the Constitutional Debate Over Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Firearms Offences

By Erin Sheley

On December 10, 2015

In Constitutional, Criminal

By: Erin Sheley

PDF Version: The Next Shot in the Constitutional Debate Over Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Firearms Offences

Case Commented On: R v Friesen, 2015 ABQB 717

The Court of Queen’s Bench has found a new constitutional limitation on Parliament’s attempt to impose mandatory minimum sentences for firearms offences. Just on the heels of R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15, where the Supreme Court struck down three- and five-year mandatory minimums for possession offences under section 95 of the Criminal Code, Mr. Justice Vital O. Ouellette has, in R v Friesen, 2015 ABQB 717, held an identical sentencing provision to be likewise unconstitutional for trafficking offences under section 99. This case suggests that Nur could have marked the beginning of widespread dismantling of the Criminal Code’s policy of gun-related mandatory minimums. In both Friesen and Nur the courts’ concerns are the same: the risk of discrepancy between the prototypical violent offenders targeted by the minimums and the potentially far less culpable parties who might be swept along by them.

Setting Aside Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service Orders for Problems with Service: It Can’t Be Done

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On December 7, 2015

In Landlord/Tenant

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Setting Aside Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service Orders for Problems with Service: It Can’t Be Done

Case Commented On: Abougouche v Miller, 2015 ABQB 724 (CanLII)

As the recently-appointed Master in Chambers, James R. Farrington, clearly and concisely sets out in Abougouche v Miller, there is no way for a tenant to have an order made by the Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service (RTDRS) set aside if a tenant fails to appear at the hearing before a Tenancy Dispute Officer because the tenant did not receive actual notice of that hearing. The tenant cannot go back to the Tenancy Dispute Officer; that person only has the power to correct typographic, grammatical, arithmetic or other similar errors in their orders, clarify their orders, and deal with obvious errors or inadvertent omissions in their orders (Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service Regulation (RTDRS Reg), Alta Reg 98/2006, section 19(1)). The tenant cannot apply to the only body with the power to cancel or vary an RTDRS order — the Court of Queen’s Bench (sections 23(1) and 25(1)(b) RTDRS Reg) — because new evidence is not permitted on appeals (section 25(1) RTDRS Reg) and evidence about service in technical compliance with the regulations but inappropriate nonetheless would be evidence that was not before the Tenancy Dispute Office, i.e., new evidence. So a tenant — even a tenant as apparently well-prepared with legal arguments as the self-represented tenant was in this case — has no opportunity to be heard on the merits. Worse, a tenant like Ms. Miller, who appears to have vacated the rented premises because of significant deficiencies, including internal flooding, seems to be set up by the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA), SA 2004, c R-17.1. That Act allows her landlord to serve notice of a RTDRS hearing on her by posting it on the rented premises that she vacated, even if the landlord knows the tenant has vacated those premises, even if she vacated for good reasons, and even if the landlord is still in regular communication with the tenant by email and text messages about the deficiencies in the rented premises (section 57(3) RTA).