ABLawg

Should the Dispute Remain Between the Accused and the Crown? Third-Party Intervention in Criminal Proceedings

On June 8, 2016

By: Jessica Magonet

PDF Version: Should the Dispute Remain Between the Accused and the Crown? Third-Party Intervention in Criminal Proceedings

Cases Commented On: R v Vallentgoed, 2016 ABCA 19 (CanLII) and R v Barton, 2016 ABCA 68 (CanLII)

Should courts shun third party intervention in criminal proceedings? Two recent Alberta Court of Appeal cases address this issue: R v Vallentgoed, 2016 ABCA 19 (CanLII) (January 2016) and R v Barton, 2016 ABCA 68 (CanLII) (March 2016).

In Vallentgoed, the Edmonton and Calgary Police Services (EPS / CPS) were denied leave to intervene in a criminal appeal by Justice Veldhuis. The appeal concerned the scope of the Crown’s obligation to disclose approved instrument (AI) maintenance logs. Approved instruments are instruments used to measure blood alcohol levels. The accused, Vallentgoed and Gubbins, were charged with impaired driving offenses and had requested additional disclosure of AI maintenance records.

In Barton, Justice Berger granted leave to intervene to the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) and the Institute for the Advancement of Aboriginal Women (IAAW) in the Crown’s appeal of Barton’s acquittal for the murder of Cindy Gladue. Ms. Gladue, a Cree woman engaged in sex work, died as a result of an injury caused by Mr. Barton. According to LEAF’s press release, “At the trial, the jury accepted the defence argument that Ms. Gladue, an Indigenous woman, had consented to ‘rough sex’ and acquitted the man accused of her murder, Bradley Barton.” (Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) and the Institute for the Advancement of Aboriginal Women (IAAW) Seek Leave to Intervene in R. v Barton).

Vexatious Proceedings Distinguished from Vexatious Litigants

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On June 6, 2016

In Access to Justice, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Vexatious Proceedings Distinguished from Vexatious Litigants

Case commented on: R.O. v D.F., 2016 ABCA 170 (CanLII)

This Court of Appeal decision is useful in drawing a distinction between litigation that is vexatious and a litigant who is vexatious. A vexatious court proceeding may be challenged under various provisions in the Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010. Typically, the vexatious proceeding is brought to an end and costs are awarded against the person responsible. The scope of the relief is confined to the one particular case. A vexatious litigant order, on the other hand, is made under section 23.1 of the Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, and typically forbids the person against whom it is made from commencing or continuing any proceedings in any court in Alberta against any person. Declaring someone to be a vexatious litigant is a much broader and more serious matter. The issue in this appeal was whether R.O. was a vexatious litigant, as the Court of Queen’s Bench judge had declared her to be, when all of her allegedly vexatious behaviour was confined to this one case.

Five Million Dollars Versus One Night in Jail

By Drew Yewchuk

On June 1, 2016

In Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Five Million Dollars Versus One Night in Jail

Case Commented On: R v Peers, 2015 ABQB 129 (CanLII), R v Peers, 2015 ABCA 407 (CanLII), leave to appeal granted May 26, 2016

On May 26, 2016 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) granted leave to appeal from the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Peers. The three appellants are all charged with a variety of offences under section194 of the Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, which provides for a maximum penalty of “a fine of not more than $5 000 000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than 5 years less a day, or to both”. The basis of their appeal is that section11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — which guarantees “the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment” — entitles them to a jury trial, because a penalty of five years less a day of imprisonment and a $5 000 000 fine is “a more severe punishment” than “imprisonment for five years”. This appeal raises a constitutional question left open 27 years ago in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 (CanLII) (Irwin Toy): can some personal economic rights be protected by the section7 Charter guarantee of “life, liberty, and security of the person?”

Balancing Freedom of Expression and the Privacy of Child Victims

By Hasna Shireen

On May 31, 2016

In Privacy, Youth and the Law

By: Hasna Shireen

PDF Version: Balancing Freedom of Expression and the Privacy of Child Victims

Case Commented On: R v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016 ABQB 204 (CanLII)

The Court in R v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation allows the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) to maintain pre-publication ban articles on the web, thus allowing access to the identity of a deceased child victim. One of the major purposes of a publication ban is to protect a child victim’s privacy and thereby ensure future victims will come forward with the assurance of anonymity. This case demonstrates that freedom of expression of the media can take priority over a victim’s privacy rights. The case also demonstrates the lack of policy and legal authority dealing with web-based material, the transmission of information, victim’s privacy, and publication bans.

Good Kid, M.A.D.D. City: Seeking Proportionality in Drunk Driving Sentencing

By Joshua Sealy-Harrington

On May 27, 2016

In Criminal, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and Joe McGrade

PDF Version: Good Kid, M.A.D.D. City: Seeking Proportionality in Drunk Driving Sentencing

Cases Commented On: R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R v Sargent, 2016 ABCA 104

Constantly drinking and drive. Hit the powder then watch this flame that arrive in his eye. […] I live inside the belly of the rough Compton, USA. Made me an angel on angel dust.

–good kid m.A.A.d. city (Kendrick Lamar, 2012)

Despite the Supreme Court’s recent consideration of the law governing sentencing appeals, such appeals remain a controversial area of legal analysis for our appellate courts. This persisting ambiguity, which is rooted in how the law is applied, rather than the law itself, motivates us to revisit the Court’s leading decision in R v Lacasse. This comment summarizes the majority and dissenting judgments in Lacasse, notes the ambiguity left by the disagreement between those judgments, outlines a recent Alberta Court of Appeal decision – R v Sargent, 2016 ABCA 104 – which demonstrates that ambiguity, and discusses the significant policy consequences associated with the Supreme Court’s unanimous holding that it is appropriate to more severely punish individuals with sympathetic mitigating factors (good kids) when they reside in communities with high crime rates (mad cities).