ABLawg - - Page 233

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: The Application of stare decisis in Administrative Decision-Making

Case Commented On: Altus Group v Calgary (City), 2015 ABCA 86

In Altus Group v Calgary (City), 2015 ABCA 86, the Alberta Court of Appeal confronts the application of stare decisis to administrative tribunal decision-making. Some would say it is a truism that statutory decision-makers are not bound by precedent given the fact-intensive and policy-laden nature of their work, and that most tribunal members have little or no substantive legal training. Jurists of Diceyan thought have surely held this position and indeed typically point to the very absence of stare decisis in administrative law to bolster their suspicion of and disregard for statutory decision-making and to justify the need for intrusive judicial scrutiny. In modern times, a tribunal seeking to downplay arguments based on precedent might be expected to respond along the lines of “[w]hile our earlier decisions may be relevant and even persuasive in this case, we are not bound by these previous rulings.” But on the other hand, many administrative law practitioners have no doubt appeared before a tribunal who references its earlier decisions and the need for consistency to support a particular ruling. Perhaps all we can say for sure is that the application of stare decisis to administrative decision-making is a tricky business.

Assessing Canada’s Habitat/Fisheries Protection Regime: A Near Total Abdication of Responsibility?

By Martin Olszynski

On May 15, 2015

In Environmental, Fisheries Regulation

By: Martin Olszynski and Alex Grigg

PDF Version: Assessing Canada’s Habitat/Fisheries Protection Regime: A Near Total Abdication of Responsibility?

Legislation Commented On: Section 35 of the Fisheries Act, RSC 1985 c F-14, as amended by the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act SC 2012, c 19

Roughly three years ago (on June 29, 2012), Bill C-38, the omnibus budget bill also known as the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, received royal assent. As most ABlawg readers will surely know, Bill C-38 fundamentally changed some of Canada’s most important environmental laws. Among these were changes to the Fisheries Act and a new regime for the protection of fish habitat in particular. Section 35 of the Act, which used to prohibit any work or undertaking that resulted in the “harmful alteration or disruption, or the destruction” (HADD) of fish habitat, was amended to prohibit works, undertakings and activities that result in “serious harm to fish that are part of a commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fishery,” serious harm being defined as “the death of fish or any permanent alteration to, or destruction of, fish habitat” (DPAD). At the time of Bill C-38’s passage, this wording was widely panned as vague, confusing and bound to reduce the scope of protection for fish habitat (see here, here, here, here and our own professor emeritus Arlene Kwasniak here). This summer – and with a view towards a Fisheries Act panel at the Journal of Environmental Law and Practice’s 5^th conference in Kananaskis in June – we are conducting research to assess the merits of this new regime. This blog sets out our approach and some preliminary findings. Long story short, it appears that the federal government has all but abdicated its role in protecting fish habitat in Canada.

A “Convicted Terrorist” By Any Other Name

By Maureen Duffy

On May 13, 2015

In Constitutional, Criminal, International Law, Youth and the Law

By: Maureen Duffy

PDF Version: A “Convicted Terrorist” By Any Other Name

Cases Generally Considered: Pelham, Warden of the Bowden Institution, et al. v. Khadr, No. 36081 (Alberta) (Criminal) (SCC, By Leave); Bowden Institution v Khadr, 2015 ABCA 159; Khadr v Bowden Institution, 2015 ABQB 261; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Warden of Bowden Institution, 2015 FC 173; Khadr v Edmonton Institution, 2014 ABCA 225; Khadr v Edmonton Institution, 2013 ABQB 611

“What’s In a Name?”

Shakespeare famously wrote:

’Tis but thy name that is my enemy;

Thou art thyself though, not a Montague.

What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,

Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part

Belonging to a man. O! be some other name:

What’s in a name? that which we call a rose

By any other name would smell as sweet …

The idea, of course, is that names may be superficial labels, which do not, by themselves, define the character of the person to whom they are attached. Rather, they can be misleading, giving an impression of a person that is entirely different from reality.

Kaddoura v Hanson : The Alberta Rules of Court Regarding Disclosure Work; Delay Tactics Sourced In Old Rule Logic and Old Rule Opinion Do Not

By Brett Code, Q.C.

On May 12, 2015

In Civil Procedure

By: Brett Code, Q.C.

PDF Version: Kaddoura v Hanson: The Alberta Rules of Court Regarding Disclosure Work; Delay Tactics Sourced In Old Rule Logic and Old Rule Opinion Do Not

Case Commented On: Kaddoura v Hanson, 2015 ABCA 154

In Kaddoura v Hanson, 2015 ABCA 154, the Alberta Court of Appeal eliminated from current and future consideration several old arguments regularly advanced under the old Rules of Court by parties wanting to avoid complete record disclosure and wanting to use the available motions process and its concomitant rights of appeal to delay the discovery process. In a case concerning the record disclosure obligations of third-partied lawyers alleged by straw buyers in mortgage fraud schemes to bear concurrent or exclusive responsibility for the plaintiff bank’s losses, the Court of Appeal solidified an understanding that the “new” Rules were meant to improve efficiency and reduce cost, in particular by limiting the delay and avoidance tactics previously available and oft-used by litigants under the old Rules. The message to litigants in Alberta is that the new Rules are unambiguous, and they work. Recycled arguments previously used to limit the application of the Rules to current discovery obligations will fail.

ITLOS Special Chamber Prescribes Provisional Measures with Respect to Oil and Gas Activities in Disputed Area in Case Involving Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

By Nigel Bankes

On May 11, 2015

In International Law, Law of the Sea, Natural Resources, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: ITLOS Special Chamber Prescribes Provisional Measures with Respect to Oil and Gas Activities in Disputed Area in Case Involving Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

Decision Commented On: International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Special Chamber, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean, Order with respect to the prescription of provisional measures, April 25, 2015, ITLOS Case No. 23

By way of a Special Agreement concluded on 3 December 2014, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire submitted a dispute concerning their maritime boundary to a Special Chamber (SC) of ITLOS. The SC was fully constituted on 12 January 2015 and on 27 February 2015 Côte d’Ivoire made a request for the prescription of provisional measures under Article 290(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) requiring Ghana to:

take all steps to suspend all ongoing oil exploration and exploitation operations in the disputed area;
refrain from granting any new permit for oil exploration and exploitation in the disputed area;
take all steps necessary to prevent information resulting from past, ongoing or future exploration activities conducted by Ghana, or with its authorization, in the disputed area from being used in any way whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire;
and, generally, take all necessary steps to preserve the continental shelf, its superjacent waters and its subsoil; and
desist and refrain from any unilateral action entailing a risk of prejudice to the rights of Côte d’Ivoire and any unilateral action that might lead to aggravating the dispute.