ABLawg

Is there a doctor in the house? Challenges in the assessment process of s.752.1 of the Criminal Code

On October 8, 2010

PDF version: Is there a doctor in the house? Challenges in the assessment process of s.752.1 of the Criminal Code

Case considered: R. v. Gow, 2010 ABQB 564

In September, Mr. Justice V.O. Ouellette of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench gave reasons in the trial of R. v. Gow. The key issue in the case was whether the court had jurisdiction to grant an extension for an assessment pursuant to s.752.1(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46 in the context of an application for long-term offender status. Justice Ouellette determined that the court could not grant an extension as the language of the section, when considered in the context of the amendments made to the Code in 2008 and other provisions of the Code, was clearly mandatory. However, a survey of other cases dealing with s.752.1 revealed some interesting interpretations of the provision and demonstrated that Canadian courts have read parts of this section as being substantive rather than procedural. This allows for a certain amount of wiggle room depending on the circumstances surrounding any delay in the assessment process.

Injunction Denied in Oil and Gas Right of First Refusal Case

By Nigel Bankes

On October 5, 2010

In Oil & Gas

PDF version: Injunction denied in oil and gas right of first refusal case

Case considered: NAL GP Ltd. v. BP Canada Energy Company, 2010 ABQB 626

NAL was the successor in interest to an agreement between BP and Spearpoint which afforded each party mutual rights of first refusal (ROFR). The agreement (which was not a Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen (CAPL) form) apparently covered a number of different properties. In July 2010 BP announced that it had reached an agreement with Apache to sell certain assets including the assets subject to the ROFR. There were negotiations surrounding the possible waiver of the ROFR but on September 1 NAL requested that BP prepare the ROFR notices required by the agreement. BP did so. The notices (12) were delivered September 20. The aggregate value of the 12 packages was $1.56 billion. The total sale price was $3.25 billion (US). The agreement required the ROFR to be exercised within 15 days.

In this application NAL sought a declaration that the notices were deficient or alternatively a temporary injunction. NAL also sought to examine documents relating to the sale and oral discovery of representatives of BP and Apache and sought to abridge the 15 day notice period.

Unconstitutional Regulatory Offences: Too Much and Too Little at Stake

By Donald MacCannell

On October 1, 2010

In Constitutional, Criminal

PDF version: Unconstitutional Regulatory Offences: Too Much and Too Little at Stake

Case considered: R. v. Keshane, 2010 ABPC 275

In a thorough 22 pages, Provincial Court Judge Donna Groves acquitted Renada Lee Keshane of a $500 ticket for fighting in public. Ms. Keshane was ticketed under a decade-old provision of Edmonton’s Public Places Bylaw, Bylaw 14614, which, the Court ruled, violates the constitutional division of powers. While the cost of litigating this ticket almost certainly dwarfed the fine at stake, constitutional review of bylaw offences is predictably and disturbingly sparse. “Fighting in Public” and similar provisions impose considerable limits on behaviour, but are rarely worthwhile to litigate. The potential result is the injustice of a longstanding unconstitutional provision.

Access to Justice and Representation by Agents

By Jennifer Koshan

On September 29, 2010

In Access to Justice, Constitutional, Criminal

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Access to Justice and Representation by Agents

Case Commented On: R v Frick, 2010 ABPC 280

Cutbacks to legal aid are a harsh reality in Alberta and the rest of Canada. As noted on the website of Legal Aid Alberta (LAA), “as of April 6, 2010, LAA’s eligibility guidelines for full representation by a lawyer have decreased by 30%”. This is due in part to the fact that in this province at present, legal aid funding is highly dependent upon Alberta Law Foundation revenue, and this revenue has been adversely affected by the economic downturn. It is also due to government cuts to Legal Aid. Legal Aid has developed a bandaid of sorts through Legal Services Centres, which “provide clients access to legal information, referral and brief services (in family, criminal, civil and immigration matters) with legal advice in immigration and non-family civil matters.” However, these centres exist only in Calgary and Edmonton, deal only with certain legal matters at present, and perhaps most importantly, do not provide full legal representation. Attempts by lawyers such as Dugald Christie and the Canadian Bar Association to bring constitutional claims asserting rights to representation by paid legal counsel in certain circumstances have not been successful. In such a climate, it is not surprising that other actors – such as agents – have stepped into the fray to provide legal services. A recent Alberta Provincial Court case, R v Frick, shows that there are legislative and constitutional limits to the role that agents can play in filling the gaps in legal aid.

Damages for Mental Distress in Breach of Contract

By Jassmine Girgis

On September 24, 2010

In Contracts

PDF version: Damages for Mental Distress in Breach of Contract

Case considered: J.O. v. Strathcona-Tweedsmuir School, 2010 ABQB 559

In J.O. v. Strathcona-Tweedsmuir School, the court awarded the plaintiff damages for mental distress arising from breach of contract. The facts of this case can be found in Alice Woolley’s recent ABlawg post.

The contract in question was one between the student, J.O., and the school. Ultimately, the court grounded its decision on the breach of contract in administrative fairness, finding that, based on the Private Schools Regulation (Alta. Reg. 190/2000) and on case law, the duty of fairness was an implied term of the contract. Having determined that the procedure followed by the school “fell considerably short of meeting [the school’s] duty of fairness” (para. 34), the school was in breach of its contract. The court awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of one school year’s tuition for breach of the contract of instruction, and in an interesting move, also granted her contractual damages for mental distress, arising from her expulsion.