ABLawg

Democratic Charter Rights and First-Past-The-Post: A Shallow Conception of Democracy at the Ontario Court of Appeal

On September 26, 2025

In Constitutional, Election/Voting, Equality

Case Commented On: Fair Voting BC v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 581

PDF Version: Democratic Charter Rights and First-Past-The-Post: A Shallow Conception of Democracy at the Ontario Court of Appeal

Despite many Canadians’ dissatisfaction with our current first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) election system, every attempt at reform so far has failed. The failed political attempts include the 2015 Liberal Party campaign promise to reform FPTP (at 27) and later abandonment of reform efforts, as well as the unsuccessful referendums in BC. A previous Charter-based challenge to the provincial system in Québec was dismissed in Daoust v Québec (Directeur general des élections), 2011 QCCA 1634. As of last month, the Charter challenge brought by Fair Voting BC and Springtide Collective for Democratic Society (collectively, the “Applicants”) is no exception. I will begin my commentary on Fair Voting BC v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 581 (Fair Voting BC )by providing a summary of the Applicant’s claim, as well as some background on FPTP or single member plurality (SMP), compared to the proportional representation (PR) system advocated for by the Applicants. I will then review the majority decision in Fair Voting BC, highlighting what I believe to be a narrow and impoverished view of democratic rights under the Charter and the more balanced approach taken by Justice Dawe in his concurring reasons. I will conclude by emphasizing both the difficulty and the importance of judicial protection of democratic rights. Judicial restraint is commendable, and indeed essential, to protect the ideal of a free and democratic society. However, interpreting the right to vote as being limited to the mere ability to cast a ballot, as the majority does, risks abdicating the judicial responsibility to protect the foundation upon which the entire democratic system is premised.

First Five Building Canada Act Projects of National Interest (PONIs): Hot to Trot, or All for Naught?

By David V Wright

On September 25, 2025

In Energy, Environmental, Indigenous, Natural Resources

By: David V. Wright

Matter Commented On: Building Canada Act, SC 2025, c 2, s 4

PDF Version: First Five Building Canada Act Projects of National Interest (PONIs): Hot to Trot, or All for Naught?

After months of speculation (see e.g. here), the first list of projects of national interest (PONIs) under the new Building Canada Act (BCA), SC 2025, c 2, s 4 was recently released by the federal government. So, now what? This post explores where these projects sit in the new BCA process and the legal paths ahead. Discussion is framed around several key legal questions that bring to the surface some of the complexities that will arise during implementation of the new regime. This builds on the previous ABlawg post that discussed and commented upon the basic structure of the BCA.

The Dissent in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation: Failing to Accommodate Legal Pluralism

By Jennifer Koshan

On September 24, 2025

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Indigenous

By: Jennifer Koshan, Robert Hamilton, and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

Cases Commented On: Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII); Houle v Swan River First Nation, 2025 FC 267 (CanLII); Donald-Potskin v Sawridge First Nation, 2025 FC 648 (CanLII); Cunningham v Sucker Creek First Nation 150A, 2025 FC 1174 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The Dissent in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation: Failing to Accommodate Legal Pluralism

This is the fourth and final post in our series on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII). Our last post examined the majority judgment of Justices Nicholas Kasirer and Mahmud Jamal (Richard Wagner CJ and Suzanne Cote J concurring) on the interplay between sections 15(1) and 25 of the Charter. This post focuses on the dissenting judgment of Justices Sheilah Martin and Michelle O’Bonsawin on the section 15/25 issues. As we discuss, the two opinions contrast significantly in the way they prioritize the protection of collective Indigenous rights and the claims based on individual Charter rights and freedoms. We describe and critique the dissent’s analysis and we return to the three recent decisions introduced in our third post to think through how the approach of Martin and O’Bonsawin JJ would have played out in those cases (see Houle v Swan River First Nation, 2025 FC 267 (CanLII); Donald-Potskin v Sawridge First Nation, 2025 FC 648 (CanLII); Cunningham v Sucker Creek First Nation 150A, 2025 FC 1174 (CanLII)).

BIA Preferences: Rebutting the Presumption of Intention to Prefer

By Jassmine Girgis

On September 23, 2025

In Bankruptcy and Insolvency

By: Jassmine Girgis

Case Commented On: RPG Receivables Purchase Group Inc v American Pacific Corporation, 2025 ONCA 371

PDF Version: BIA Preferences: Rebutting the Presumption of Intention to Prefer

One of the goals of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA) is to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s assets to its creditors. To that end, the BIA preference provisions allow a trustee to claw back payments made by the debtor to a creditor if the payments result in a preference to one creditor over others. The debtor can make any payments it wants while solvent, but these payments become improper if they are made when the debtor is insolvent.

CEO of the Alberta Energy Regulator Denies Public Hearing Rights on a Coal Application

By Nigel Bankes

On September 15, 2025

In Administrative Law, Environmental, Natural Resources

By: Nigel Bankes and Shaun Fluker

Decisions Commented On: AER Panel Decision (July 23, 2025 – Proceeding 449) and AER Reconsideration Decision (August 21, 2015)

PDF Version: CEO of the Alberta Energy Regulator Denies Public Hearing Rights on a Coal Application

This post comments on a recent interlocutory proceeding at the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER or Regulator) concerning a motion by Summit Coal Inc. (Summit) to cancel a scheduled public hearing on its coal mine project application. The basis for the motion was that all the directly and adversely affected persons who initially opposed the application, had subsequently withdrawn their opposition. Accordingly, Summit submitted there was no longer a need for a public hearing to consider the application. The AER panel assigned to the hearing dismissed Summit’s motion on July 23, ruling that the hearing should proceed because two ENGOs with full participation status in the hearing remain opposed to the application. On August 21 the AER’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Rob Morgan issued a reconsideration decision that reversed the panel’s ruling and cancelled the public hearing. Two novel questions of law under the Responsible Energy Development Act, SA 2012, c R-17.3 (REDA) arise from these decisions: (1) as a matter of law does the CEO have the authority to vary or reverse a decision of a panel of a hearing commissioners seized with an application to the AER and (2) what is the legal significance of being “directly and adversely affected” for the purposes of a hearing on an application before the AER.