PDF version: Consciousness and Consent in Sexual Assault Cases

Case considered: R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28

Can a person consent in advance to sexual activity that occurs while she is unconscious? A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada recently answered this question in the negative in R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28, taking the same approach as a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Ashlee, 2006 ABCA 244. There were strong dissents in each case, however, indicating that the resolution of this issue is far from obvious for some judges. Also interesting is that judges on both sides of the issue frame their analyses in terms of the sexual autonomy of the complainant, and see their decisions as consistent (or at least not inconsistent) with the leading Supreme Court of Canada authority on consent, R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330. This comment will discuss the J.A. and Ashlee decisions and assess the merits of the different reasons for decision in light of the applicable statutory provisions and case law and the courts’ attention (or lack thereof) to context.

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PDF version: Issue of Timing Arises Again: Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Quashes Decision of Information and Privacy Commissioner for Reasonable Apprehension of Bias 

Case considered: Alberta Teachers’ Association v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2011 ABQB 19 (”Wright“)

Once again, the issue of timing in the investigation of privacy complaints has been raised. In Alberta Teachers’ Association v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (”Wright“), pending litigation on the issue of timing currently before the Supreme Court of Canada (”SCC”) prevented the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench from dealing with the timing issue; see the “Supreme Court hears Alberta Privacy Case” post commenting on ATA News v Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2010 ABCA 26 (”ATA News“). Nevertheless, since timing was raised again as an issue in Wright, the outcome of the SCC decision in ATA News will be important.

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PDF version: The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s Marriage Commissioners Decision – the never-ending fight for human rights of same-sex couples  

Case and Legislation commented on: In the Matter of Marriage Commissioners Appointed under the Marriage Act, SS 1995, c M-4.1, 2001 SKCA 3; Marriage Act, RSA 2000, c M-5.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered two proposed amendments to the Marriage Act, S.S. 1995, c. M-4.1. The Act legislates on the solemnization of marriage in Saskatchewan. It provides for specific religious officials and marriage commissioners to solemnize marriages. The Lieutenant Governor in Council in Saskatchewan sought the Court’s opinion on potentially amending the Marriage Act after complaints from marriage commissioners who said that solemnizing same-sex marriages breached their rights under s.2(a) of the Charter. (more…)

PDF version: Supreme Court Broadly Interprets s. 99(1) of the National Energy Board Act 

Case considered: Smith v Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7

In Smith v Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7 (Smith) all nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed a broad view of the power of the federal Pipeline Arbitration Committee (PAC) established under the National Energy Board Act, RSC 1985 c N-7 (NEBA) to award costs to a claimant to an arbitration proceeding. Committee costs may include solicitor-client costs of related litigation. The Court grounded its finding in subsection 99(1) of the NEBA, which if triggered requires a company to pay “all legal, appraisal and other costs determined by the Committee to have been reasonably incurred by that person in asserting that person’s claim for compensation,” and in the history of statutory reform of the law of expropriation, specifically the principle of full compensation for expropriation. The Court was silent on the Federal Court of Appeal finding that matters for which a committee may award compensation are restricted by section 84 of the NEBA, under which litigation costs are not compensable (Alliance Pipeline Ltd. v Smith, 2009 FCA 110 at para. 55 (Smith FCA)). The impact of Smith may be limited to cases in which compensation awarded by the committee exceeds 85 percent of the value offered by the company, as the statutory basis for the Court’s decision is subsection 99(1), and the subsection is triggered only where the 85 percent threshold is exceeded.

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Case considered: Information and Privacy Commissioner v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, an appeal from 2010 ABCA 26

Yesterday the Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal in Information and Privacy Commissioner v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, an appeal from 2010 ABCA 26. For a comment on the Court of Appeal decision, see Court of Appeal Decision on Privacy Process Likely to Have Significant Impact on Office of Information and Privacy Commissioner. Here is a summary of the case from the SCC’s website: “Ten individuals complained to the Office of the appellant Information and Privacy Commissioner that the respondent Alberta Teachers’ Association disclosed, in contravention of the Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P 6.5, their personal information by publishing their names and other information about them in a publication called the “ATA News”. The adjudicator found that the Association had disclosed the complainants’ personal information contrary to ss. 7 and 19 of the Act. On judicial review, the adjudicator’s decision was quashed on the basis that the Commissioner lost jurisdiction for failing to comply with the time lines set out in s. 50(5) of the Act. The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld that decision.” The issues raised in the case include: Whether it is appropriate for a court, on judicial review, to review a matter that has not been decided by the tribunal at first instance? What consequences ought to flow when a tribunal breaches a statutorily imposed time line?

PDF version: Interim Costs and Access to Justice at the Supreme Court of Canada 

Case considered: R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5

The Supreme Court recently upheld the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Caron, 2009 ABCA 34. That decision affirmed the jurisdiction of a superior court to award interim costs for public interest litigation before the provincial court, and found that Caron’s language rights challenge was an appropriate one in which to order interim costs pursuant to the test in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371 (Okanagan). The Supreme Court’s decision was unanimous (with a majority judgment by Justice Ian Binnie and a concurring judgment by Justice Rosalie Abella), and was welcomed by groups such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA). The CCLA had intervened in the case along with a number of other public interest groups, indicating some anxiety that entitlement to interim costs awards as originally set out in Okanagan may be further restricted by the Supreme Court, a restriction it commenced in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 (Little Sisters (No.2)).

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Case commented on: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society et al., 2009 ABCA 403, appeal heard January 27, 2011

On January 27, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada heard arguments in the case of Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society et al. The case arose after the provincial Health Minister issued a directive in August 1991 indicating that the operators of long term care facilities in Alberta were to charge and collect the maximum accommodation charge permitted by s. 3(1) of the Nursing Homes Operation Regulation, A.R. 258/85. The plaintiffs sought to certify class action proceedings under the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-16.5, on behalf of approximately 14,000 long term care facility residents. The plaintiffs argued that the residents had been overcharged because the Crown and Regional Health Authorities did not ensure that the monies paid by them for the “accommodation charge” were used solely for accommodation and meals. The class proceedings were certified by Justice Sheila Greckol of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (see 2008 ABQB 490) and this decision was upheld by the Alberta Court of Appeal (2009 ABCA 403, per Justices Conrad, Berger and Rowbotham). The overall issue in the case is whether class proceedings were properly certified, which in turn raises issues related to the underlying cause of action. The Supreme Court described those issues as follows: What is the test for imposing a fiduciary duty upon the Crown outside the Aboriginal context? Does the province owe a private law duty to “exercise all reasonable care, skill and diligence with respect to the administration, monitoring and auditing of the public funding provided to operators and the accommodation charges paid to operators by residents”? If the province does not owe a fiduciary duty or duty of care with respect to setting the maximum accommodation charge, can dismissal of the common law claims against the province be avoided by pleading unjust enrichment? Do the pleadings support a Charter damages claim? Should a class action be certified based on any surviving cause of action? The Supreme Court reserved its decision in the case.

PDF version: Is R v Gomboc really only about a homeowner’s expectation of privacy or is there more to it? 

Case commented on: R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55

The late November 2010 decision of Canada’s Supreme Court in R. v. Gomboc has come to represent one of two things in the divergent views of its critics and supporters. For critics from a civil libertarian perspective, our highest court’s approval of a power company’s act, pursuant to a warrantless police request, of monitoring a homeowner’s electrical usage and then providing that information to police engaged in a criminal investigation represents yet another example of a culture of authoritarianism that seems to be creeping into Canada’s judiciary. On the other hand, for the “law and order” crowd, especially those who see warrants as pesky obstacles to simply letting the police get on with it and just do their jobs, homeowners have no reasonable expectation of privacy over information about their electrical usage, so the Supreme Court’s decision that an authorizing warrant was not required is spot on. Furthermore, even if there was a breach of any privacy interest a person may have here, then it was so trivial that any fuss over it is unwarranted.

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PDF version: Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Charter: LEAF’s Intervention in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham 

Case considered: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), et al. v. Barbara Cunningham, et al. (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Case number 33340, on appeal from Cunningham v. Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 239

The Supreme Court of Canada is scheduled to hear the appeal of the Alberta government in Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham on Thursday, December 16, 2010. Cunningham will be the first case in which the Supreme Court considers the application of section 15(2) of the Charter since that Court gave independent meaning to section 15(2) in R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 and the first case in which the Court must consider the possible application of section 15(2) when the challenge is on the basis of under-inclusiveness. This comment is based on my experience serving on the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) case subcommittee in Cunningham, the factum filed by LEAF, and, to a much lesser extent and only to offer a contrast, the facta of the Appellants and the Attorney General of Ontario.

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PDF version: Little Salmon and the juridical nature of the duty to consult and accommodate 

Case commented on: Beckman v Little/Salmon Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53

This is the first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to deal head on with the relationship between the terms of a constitutionally protected land claims agreement (LCA) and the duty to consult and accommodate. The Court holds that the terms of an LCA do not exhaust the Crown’s duty to consult, or, to put it another way, an LCA is not a complete code but is embedded in the general legal system embracing both constitutional law norms and administrative law norms. This means that the Crown may have consultation obligations that are additive to those found in the text of an LCA. However, the majority articulates a narrow view of the content of the duty to consult and thus it was easy for the Court to find that the Crown — here the Government of Yukon (YTG) — had satisfied its obligations. In my view the content of the duty to consult articulated by the Court in this case is no greater than that which would be provided by the application of standard principles of administrative law. This impoverished view of the duty to consult is hardly likely to contribute to the constitutional goal of inter-societal reconciliation.

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