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Category: Supreme Court of Canada Page 7 of 22

Mennillo v Intramodal inc.: The Supreme Court of Canada Revisits the Oppression Remedy

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On February 17, 2017

In Corporate / Commercial, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jassmine Girgis

PDF Version: Mennillo v Intramodal inc.: The Supreme Court of Canada Revisits the Oppression Remedy

Case Commented On: Mennillo v Intramodal inc., 2016 SCC 51 (CanLII)

Mennillo v Intramodal inc. is the first oppression remedy case since BCE Inc. v 1976 Debentureholders 2008 SCC 69 (CanLII) (BCE) to reach the Supreme Court of Canada. The SCC had to determine whether the failure of a company to observe formalities required under the Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 (CBCA) constituted oppression as against a former shareholder. The appeal of the former shareholder was dismissed on a finding that neither “sloppy paperwork on its own” nor “the corporation and its controlling shareholder treating [the former shareholder] exactly as he wanted to be treated” (at para 5) constituted oppression. There was a majority opinion (written by Cromwell J), a concurring opinion (McLachlin CJ and Moldaver J), and a strong dissent by Justice Côté.

This post deals with the comments made by the Court, including the dissent, on the oppression remedy. The oppression remedy is available when the court is satisfied that the corporation or its directors acted in a way that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, any security holder, creditor, director, or officer (CBCA, s 241(2)).

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The Alberta Energy Regulator in the Post-Information World: Best-in-Class?

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On January 18, 2017

In Administrative Law, Constitutional, Energy, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Shaun Fluker and Sharon Mascher

PDF Version: The Alberta Energy Regulator in the Post-Information World: Best-in-Class?

Statement Commented On: Alberta Energy Regulator Public Statement 2017-01-13

As readers will know, on Friday January 13, 2017 the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1 (CanLII) and our colleague Jennifer Koshan set out what the Court actually decided in her Die Another Day: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator and the Future of Statutory Immunity Clauses for Charter Damages comment posted to ABlawg on Monday January 16. Our comment here critically reflects on the Public Statement issued by the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) on Friday the 13th on the Ernst decision. This statement reads like the work of a spin doctor and harms the credibility of the AER as a ‘best-in class regulator’. In our view the Public Statement is inappropriate, contains inaccuracies, and should be rescinded by the AER.

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Die Another Day: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator and the Future of Statutory Immunity Clauses for Charter Damages

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On January 16, 2017

In Constitutional, Energy, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Die Another Day: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator and the Future of Statutory Immunity Clauses for Charter Damages

Case Commented On: Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1 (CanLII)

On January 13, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1 (CanLII), an appeal it heard in January 2016. As noted in a previous ABlawg post, the appeal arose from the decisions of Alberta courts to strike Jessica Ernst’s claim for damages against the Energy Resources Conservation Board (now the Alberta Energy Regulator) for allegedly violating her freedom of expression under s 2(b) of the Charter. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the decisions to strike her claim should be upheld, which turned on whether the statutory immunity clause in s 43 of the Energy Resources Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c E-10 (ERCA) could constitutionally bar a claim for damages under s 24(1) of the Charter against the Board. The length of time the Court took to deliver its decision might be explained by the Court’s 4:4:1 split. Justice Abella serves as the swing judge by siding with Justice Cromwell (with Justices Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon) in upholding the decision that Ernst’s claim for Charter damages should be struck, basing her decision primarily on Ernst’s failure to provide notice of the constitutional challenge in earlier proceedings. I had predicted that the Supreme Court would deny leave to appeal based on that lack of notice, yet had to eat my words when a three-member panel of the Court – including Justice Abella – granted leave despite the lack of notice. The other two judges who granted the leave application, Karakatsanis and Côté JJ, are split between the Cromwell faction and the dissent (written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Moldaver and Brown, with Justice Côté concurring), which would have allowed the appeal and permitted Ernst’s claim for Charter damages against the Board to proceed.

This post will parse the three judgments to determine what the Court actually decided on the viability of the Charter damages claim and for what reasons. There may be subsequent posts by my colleagues on other aspects of the decision. It is important to note that Ernst’s underlying tort claims against Encana and the provincial government for contamination of her groundwater are ongoing; the Supreme Court only ruled on whether Ernst’s claim for Charter damages against the Board for violating her freedom of expression could proceed.

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Supreme Court to Render Judgment in Ernst on Friday

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On January 11, 2017

In Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

PDF Version: Supreme Court to Render Judgment in Ernst on Friday

Case Commented On: Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2013 ABQB 537, aff’d 2014 ABCA 285, leave to appeal granted April 30, 2015 (SCC)

On Friday, January 13, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada will deliver its long-awaited judgment in Jessica Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator. As Jessica Ernst notes on her blog, the appeal was heard on January 12, 2016, making it the only case from the 2016 spring session in which the Court has not yet rendered judgment.

The case involves the issue of whether a statutory immunity clause (in this case, s 43 of the Energy Resources Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c E-10) can bar a Charter claim for a remedy under s 24(1) of the Charter (in this case, a claim for damages for an alleged violation of Ernst’s freedom of expression by the respondent regulator). Earlier decisions in the case involved broader issues related to administrative law and negligence as against the regulator, the provincial government, and Encana for the contamination of Ms. Ernst’s groundwater allegedly caused by Encana’s hydraulic fracturing operations in the Rosebud area. ABlawg has posted several comments on this litigation, which are available here (from most recent to oldest):

Jennifer Koshan, Leave to Appeal granted in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator

Shaun Fluker, Ernst v Alberta Environment: The Gatekeeper Refuses to Strike or Grant Summary Judgment

Martin Olszynski, Regulatory Negligence Redux: Alberta Environment’s Motion to Strike in Fracking Litigation Denied

Jennifer Koshan, The Charter Issue(s) in Ernst: Awaiting Another Day

Shaun Fluker, Ernst v Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board): The Gatekeeper is Alive and Well

Martin Olszynski, Revisiting Regulatory Negligence: The Ernst Fracking Litigation

Watch for commentary on the forthcoming SCC decision on ABlawg.

The Dangers of Inconsistency (and Consistency) in Supreme Court Jurisprudence

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On December 7, 2016

In Administrative Law, Ethics and the Legal Profession, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: The Dangers of Inconsistency (and Consistency) in Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Case Commented On: Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. University of Calgary, 2016 SCC 53 (CanLII)

I can’t decide whether I am more excited that the Supreme Court issued a decision dealing with two legal issues of great interest to me – administrative law standard of review and statutory incursions into solicitor-client privilege – or irritated that the Court’s handling of both issues is so annoying. Because it is the end of term, and I’m as grumpy as any other professor at the end of term, I am mostly irritated. Irritated because on standard of review the Court seems literally incapable of a consistent and practical approach, while on solicitor-client privilege the Court has been so consistent that it risks fetishizing the significance of solicitor-client confidentiality to the point of jeopardizing other important legal interests.

On standard of review the Court needs to stop. It needs to stop trying to articulate and apply a set of rules for judicial deference to administrative decision-makers. It should instead let administrative judicial review be a matter of practice and the appropriate judicial attitude, one of respectful attention to any decision-maker’s reasons for a particular decision, while recognizing that judges provide a sober second thought through judicial review, particularly on matters of legal interpretation. Along with significantly shifting every decade or so, the rules identified end up being misleading at best and unhelpful at worst, failing to capture the basic and in the end relatively straightforward idea that standard of review reflects. The Court’s attempt to articulate rules governing standard of review is like a baseball coach trying to develop a set of rules for players to use when deciding whether to swing, when the appropriate advice is both simple and incapable of more precise articulation: swing at a strike; don’t swing at a ball (or, alternately, swing at a pitch you have the skill to hit, and leave the rest alone).

On solicitor-client privilege, the Supreme Court can certainly claim to have been consistent: solicitor-client privilege is generously defined and strenuously protected. On the whole, that seems to me a good thing. But this decision raises the possibility that that consistent and vigorous protection may go beyond what is necessary for protection of the privilege, and may occur at the expense of other values of importance to the legal system.

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