Category: Supreme Court of Canada Page 22 of 23

As noted in my previous post on Tsuu T’ina Nation v. Bearchief, the Tsuu T’ina Nation was effectively prevented from enforcing an eviction notice against residents of Black Bear Crossing (BBC) whose band membership was disputed, until such time as the membership of the residents was resolved. The Tsuu T’ina’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Justices Morris Fish and Marshall Rothstein on October 30, 2008 (with costs against the Tsuu T’ina Nation).

The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious “inherent” probabilities or improbabilities

By Brett Code, Q.C.

On November 13, 2008

In Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53

PDF Version: The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious “inherent” probabilities or improbabilities

* Brett Code acknowledges the able assistance of Shankar Kamath, a student-at-law at Bennett Jones LLP.

In F.H. v. McDougall, released October 2, 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that there is only one standard of proof in a civil case: proof on a balance of probabilities. A mixed series of cases over the last 50 years had caused uncertainty as to the applicable standard of proof when trying allegations of morally blameworthy conduct, for example, of fraud, of sexual assault in the civil context or of dishonesty in the context of professional conduct by lawyers (see for example Bater v. Bater, [1950] 2 All E.R. 458 at 459 (C.A., Lord Denning); H.F. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] B.C.J. No. 436, 2002 BCSC 325 at para 154; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138; Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 164 at 169-171). What had evolved was an apparently sliding scale, sometimes requiring plaintiffs to meet a higher standard of proof, a standard often said to be commensurate with the occasion. That uncertainty is now resolved, perhaps finally.

Leave to appeal refused by Supreme Court in Drug Testing Case

By Jennifer Koshan

On June 3, 2008

In Human Rights, Labour/Employment, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: Director of the Alberta Human Rights and Citzenship Commission, et al. v. Kellogg Brown & Root (Canada) Company, 2007 ABCA 426

In the May 29, 2008 version of his S.C.C. L@wletter Eugene Meehan reports that the Supreme Court of Canada has dismissed the application of the Director of the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission for leave to appeal in the case of Kellogg Brown & Root (Canada) Company (at the time of writing the SCC’s decision on leave to appeal is not yet available on its website). For posts on the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in this case, see Linda McKay Panos, “Court of Appeal Sends Court of Queen’s Bench Decision to Rehab” and David Corry, “Drug Testing: A Wake-up Call to the Courts ”. Linda and David disagreed about the correctness of the Alberta Court of Appeal’s approach, which overturned the decision of Madam Justice Sheilah Martin and upheld the position of the employer. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court will not take advantage of the opportunity to clarify the law in this area. This leaves it uncertain for employers, employees and human rights tribunals whether perceived addiction to alcohol and drugs is covered by human rights legislation, and in what circumstances employers are entitled to implement drug and alcohol testing policies without running afoul of human rights legislation.

Vriend Ten Years Later

By Linda McKay-Panos

On May 21, 2008

In Constitutional, Human Rights, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Linda McKay-Panos

PDF Version: Vriend Ten Years Later

Case Commented On: Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493

April 2, 2008 marked the 10th anniversary of the release of the SCC decision in Vriend v Alberta. This decision was remarkable in many ways. First, there were no less than 17 intervenors by the time the case reached the SCC. Our affiliated agency, the Alberta Civil Liberties Association, was one of those intervenors. The case was significant because of the remedy that was ordered by the SCC and because of the analysis that the SCC undertook in determining that sexual orientation should be included as a protected ground in Alberta’s Individual’s Rights Protection Act (“IRPA”, now called the Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act (“HRCMA”), R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14). It is also interesting to examine what has happened in the area of sexual orientation and human rights since this noteworthy case.

Dunsmuir: Much Ado about Nothing

By Shaun Fluker

On May 16, 2008

In Administrative Law, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9

PDF Version: Dunsmuir: Much Ado about Nothing

The majority judgment in Dunsmuir, written by Justices Bastarache and Lebel JJ. (writing also for Fish, Abella, and McLachlin JJ.), begins by setting out its grandiose intention to re-examine judicial review principles in Canadian administrative law with the view to making them more workable and coherent. In an initial glance, one is immediately struck by how such an immense and significant task is built upon a seemingly insignificant set of facts. The appellant, a former non-unionized provincial employee who was dismissed with pay in lieu of notice, sought to uphold a grievance arbitrator’s ruling that his employment be reinstated. In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court judgment follows that of both the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal. One cannot also help but notice that in purporting to reformulate the pragmatic and functional approach to substantive judicial review, Dunsmuir consists of three concurring but inconsistent sets of reasons. Indeed, it is difficult to envision Dunsmuir as a defining moment in Canadian administrative law along the lines of CUPE Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Board, [1979] 2 SCR 227, Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Police Commissioners, [1979] 1 SCR 311, Knight v. Indian Head School Division, [1990] 1 SCR 653, Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982, or Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817. This is because Dunsmuir falls well short of its lofty ambitions. Binnie J.’s reasons aside, Dunsmuir is little more than formal acknowledgement of recent shifts in, and deficiencies with, the Supreme Court’s attitude towards substantive judicial review.

Category: Supreme Court of Canada Page 22 of 23

Recent Developments in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute

The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious “inherent” probabilities or improbabilities

Leave to appeal refused by Supreme Court in Drug Testing Case

Vriend Ten Years Later

Dunsmuir: Much Ado about Nothing